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ABSTRACT 
 
Risk Identification and Assessment in a Risk Based Audit Environment: The Effects of 
Budget Constraints and Decision Aid Use. (August 2005) 
Michelle Chandler Diaz, B.S., Trinity University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Christopher J. Wolfe 
 
Risk based audit (RBA) approaches represent a major trend in current audit 
methodology.  The approach is based on risk analysis used to identify business strategy 
risk.  The RBA has created a new set of research issues that need investigation.  In 
particular, this approach has important implications for risk identification and risk 
assessment.  The success of the RBA approach is contingent on understanding what 
factors improve or interfere with the accuracy of these risk judgments.   
I examine how budget constraints and decision aid use affect risk identification 
and risk assessment.  Unlike previous budget pressure studies, I cast budget constraints 
as a positive influence on auditors.  I expect more stringent budget constraints to be 
motivating to the auditor as they provide a goal for the auditor to achieve.  I also expect 
budget constraints to induce feelings of pressure leading to the use of time-pressure 
adaptation strategies.  When auditors have use of a decision aid, they take advantage of 
these motivational goals and/or use beneficial adaptive strategies.   
Overall, I find that auditor participants tend to be more accurate when identifying 
financial statement risks compared to business risks.  Budget constraints have no effect 
on risk identification for financial or business risks; they also have no effect on financial 
 iv
risk assessments. On the other hand, business risk assessments are improved by 
implementing more stringent budget constraints, but only when a decision aid is also 
provided.   
Budget constraints can affect performance through a goal theory route or a time-
pressure adaptation route.  I investigate the paths through which budget constraints 
improve business risk assessments under decision aid use.  I find that budget constraints 
directly affect performance, supporting a goal theory route.  However, I do not find that 
budget constraints are mediated by perceived budget pressure as expected.  Auditors 
appear to use a positive adaptive strategy to respond to perceived budget pressure, 
however perceived budget pressure is not induced by providing a more stringent budget. 
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CHAPTER I   
INTRODUCTION 
This study seeks to answer three major questions.  First, do auditors have different 
ability when identifying different types of risks for the audit?  Next, do budget constraints 
positively affect risk analyses on the audit?1  Finally, how do budget constraints 
cognitively influence risk assessments?  I address these questions within the unique 
environment of the risk based audit (RBA)2.  Understanding risk identification and 
assessment within the RBA environment is important because there is speculation that 
auditors have limited ability to perform these tasks (Weil 2004).  Ascertaining factors that 
can hinder or help the risk analysis processes of RBA affords opportunities to improve 
audits and possibly reduce audit failures. 
Risk-based audit approaches represent a major trend in current audit 
methodology.  Developed during the 1990s in response to changes in the business and 
economic communities, the RBA represents a “new generation” of audit approaches 
(Lemon et al. 2000).  RBA approaches are based on risk analysis used to identify 
business risk, commonly defined as risk that a client will not achieve its business 
objectives.  Although not all firms use RBA, a recent study of large, international firms 
found that most have implemented some form of the RBA (Lemon et al. 2000). 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of The Accounting Review. 
1 Throughout this paper, risk analysis is meant to refer generically to both risk identification and risk 
assessment. 
2 I use the term risk based audit throughout this text.  It is meant to be a generic reference to all audit 
approaches that use this type of methodology.  This is not meant as a reference to any single methodology, 
but instead speaks to the general trend of risk-based auditing described in Lemon et al. (2000). 
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  The RBA represents a shift in thinking about how best to audit an entity, but it is 
still rooted in the ideas of risk evaluation and knowledge of the client advocated by the 
audit risk model (Lemon et al. 2000).  The RBA approach can be thought of as a 
broadening of many of the concepts and procedures used in a traditional audit, and it is 
based on a holistic view of the client business while the traditional approach is based on a 
financial statement view (Bell et al. 1997; Bell et al. 2002; Bierstaker and O'Donnell 
2003; Lemon et al. 2000).  Understanding what the financial statements say about the 
company is certainly a part of the RBA, but the RBA demands additional client 
understanding developed through strategic analysis, management discussion, and industry 
training (Lemon et al. 2000, 10).  Within each aspect of the audit, the shift from the 
traditional approach to the RBA approach can appear to be subtle (Bell et al. 1997).  
When taken together, however, it is easy to see that the RBA approach makes a 
significant departure from the traditional methodology (Eilifson et al. 2001).  Table 1 
provides a summary of key differences between the traditional audit approach and the 
RBA approach. 
RBA has created a new set of research issues that need investigation (Gramling et 
al. 2001).  As auditors move to a risk-driven audit focus, new types of audit judgments 
are relevant.  In particular, the shift has important implications for risk identification and 
assessment.  Factors that interfere with or improve auditor ability to identify, assess, and 
ultimately reduce risk, are important to ensuring the success of the RBA approach.  This 
study focuses on understanding how budget constraints affect risk identification and risk 
assessment, as well as proposing a solution for improving risk assessments. 
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Table 1. 
Comparison of Traditional and Risk Based Audit Approaches3  
 
Traditional Audit Risk-Based Audit 
Financial Statement/Transactions Cycle 
View 
Holistic View of Client Strategic 
Objectives 
Audit Risk Business Risk 
Accounting Information Processes Critical Business Processes 
Accounting and Auditing Expertise Business and Industry Expertise 
Understanding of the business Understanding of business and the system 
of businesses in which the client operates 
Partners develop rich mental models of 
client and business relationships 
The whole engagement team shares rich 
mental models of the client and business 
relationships 
Focus on processing errors as a source of 
financial misstatements 
Focus on business environment, 
governance, and managerial control as 
sources for financial misstatements 
Financial Statement Attestation Value-added Client Service 
 
 
There are several recent studies focusing on the advantages and disadvantages of 
the risk-based audit approach (Ballou et al. 2004; Ballou and Heitger 2003; Bierstaker 
and O'Donnell 2003; Choy and King 2002; Cullinan and Sutton 2002; Kotchetova 2004; 
O'Donnell and Schultz 2003).  While these studies offer some insight into the RBA, none 
of these studies address the identification of audit risks.  Also, previous studies have not 
addressed budget constraints within the RBA context.  I expect that budget constraints 
affect the risk assessment portion of an RBA audit.  For these reasons, this study 
contributes to the overall understanding of the RBA approach and its effectiveness within 
a realistic audit setting. 
                                                 
3 The above table was compiled using the following sources:  (Bell et al. 1997; Bell et al. 2002; Lemon et 
al. 2000). 
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Budget Constraints, Risk Identification and Risk Assessment 
Budget pressure and time pressure have been studied extensively in the audit 
literature (Alderman and Deitrick 1982; Asare et al. 2000; Kelley and Margheim 1990; 
Kelley and Seiler 1982; Kermis and Mahapatra 1985; Lightner et al. 1982; Low 2004; 
Marxen 1990; McDaniel 1990; Ponemon 1992).  Low and moderate levels of pressure 
can provide some benefits, while extreme pressure results in unwanted behaviors on the 
part of auditors, including premature signoff, omission of audit steps, and under-reporting 
of hours worked (Alderman and Deitrick 1982; Asare et al. 2000; Kelley and Margheim 
1990; Kelley and Seiler 1982; Kermis and Mahapatra 1985; Lightner et al. 1982; 
Ponemon 1992).  This study addresses moderate levels of budget pressure; therefore I 
expect benefits from the implementation of more stringent time budgets.   
 These budget constraint benefits can occur via two theoretical routes. First, 
budget constraints can serve as a goal for the auditor to achieve.  Goals that are seen as a 
challenge result in positive increases in performance (Drach-Zahavy and Erez 2002).  
Goals only have a positive effect when auditors have the ability to accept the goal.  
Without this ability, the effects of goals are significantly reduced or possibly non-existent 
(Drach-Zahavy and Erez 2002; Durham et al. 2000).  An alternative route is a time 
pressure adaptation route.  When faced with time pressure, there are three possible 
responses.  Two of these, working faster and filtering information, are adaptive in the 
sense that they decrease time spent and can provide positive results (Durham et al. 2000; 
Payne et al. 1993).  The final strategy of changing methods, possibly to a simple heuristic 
method, is maladaptive (Durham et al. 2000; Payne et al. 1993).  In order to take 
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advantage of the adaptive strategies, auditors must have the ability to work faster or to 
filter the information.  I expect auditor ability is already well developed related to 
financial risks, but suspect it is less developed for business risks.  I hypothesize that 
decision aid use supplements auditor knowledge structures related to business risks and 
provides a means for auditors to take advantage of the positive effects of a more stringent 
budget. 
I investigate these propositions in two separate but related case-based 
experiments.  One hundred forty-two audit seniors from a Big Four accounting firm that 
uses an RBA approach participated in the experiments during a firm-sponsored training 
course.  My first experiment dealt with the ability of the auditors to identify both business 
and financial risks under varied budget pressure.  My second experiment focused on how 
budget constraints and decision aid use affects risk assessments. 
In Experiment One, I find that the risks identified by the auditor participants tend 
to be more accurate when the auditor is identifying financial statement risks compared to 
business risks.  This result is interesting, as one of the main principles of the RBA 
approach is the use of business risks to better understand the client and effectively audit 
the client.  Failure to identify risks has been suggested as a shortcoming of the RBA 
method (Weil 2004).  My finding suggests that RBA approaches may be limited by 
auditor ability to identify business risks, supporting recent criticisms of this methodology.  
I further test the effects of budget constraints on risk identification.  I find that time 
constraints have no effect on risk identification for financial or business risks.   
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In Experiment Two, I test the effects of budget constraints and decision aid use on 
risk assessment.  I find that financial risk assessments are not affected by budget 
constraints or by decision aid use.  This is likely due to the well-developed knowledge 
structures related to financial risks, as well as concern for conservatism in identifying 
financial risks.  For business risk assessments, however, I find stringent budget 
constraints and decision aid use interact to affect accuracy.  When auditors had use of a 
decision aid, providing a more stringent budget constraint led to improved risk 
assessments.   
I also investigate the paths by which budget constraints affect business risk 
assessments for auditors using a decision aid.  Under decision aid use, I find that business 
risk assessments are improved directly by more stringent budgets, suggesting that goal 
theory is one route influencing risk assessment performance.  However, I do not find that 
budget constraints are mediated by perceived budget pressure.  Under decision aid use, 
perceived budget pressure does lead to improved business risk assessments, though it is 
not predicated on budget constraints as expected. 
To summarize, the main findings of this study are: (1) audit seniors are better able 
to identify financial risks compared to business risks; (2) budget constraints do not 
improve risk identification; and (3) with decision aid use, budget constraints improve 
performance on business risk assessment.   
This study makes several contributions to both theory and practice.  First, it 
informs the audit literature regarding auditor ability to identify risks in the RBA 
environment.  It also informs literature on the positive effects of time budgets, and it 
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informs the decision aid literature as it relates to risk assessments.  I find that the ability 
of audit seniors to identify business risks is limited, implying that improvements in 
training or other methods are necessary in order for RBA approaches to be most 
effective.  Finally, this study indicates that more stringent budget constraints can provide 
positive outcomes when personnel have the ability to act on these goals, suggesting that 
firms may be able to improve business risk assessments through simple decision aid 
tools.   
The paper will proceed as follows.  In Chapter II relevant hypotheses are 
developed based on an analysis of audit literature and psychology literatures covering 
goal theory and time constraints.  This is followed by a description of the research 
methodology in Chapter III.  Chapter IV provides the results of the data collected for 
Experiment One and Experiment Two.  Finally, Chapter V provides a summarization of 
the research, its limitations, and conclusions drawn from the results. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the logic and theories underlying my 
experimental predictions.  I contend that auditors are better able to identify certain types 
of audit risks, specifically, financial risks.  Auditors are able to better identify these risks 
because they have more developed knowledge related to financial risks.  Alternatively, I 
expect that auditors do not have well-developed knowledge for business risk analysis.  
When auditors lack well-developed knowledge for risk analysis, I propose the use of a 
decision aid.  Under decision aid use, I predict that the motivational aspects of goals and 
adaptive time pressure strategies improve auditor business risk analysis. 
Identification of Financial versus Business Risks 
Risk identification is important in the audit planning process, is key to the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the audit, and is an important factor in carrying out 
substantive tests (Bedard and Graham 2002).  The importance of correctly identifying 
audit risks is easy to understand because the failure to identify a risk means that no work 
can be done to control exposure to that risk.  An RBA approach stresses the importance 
of both financial and business risks because business risks can ultimately have an effect 
on the financials.  When auditors do not recognize potential risks, audit failures may 
result because appropriate actions to mitigate these risks cannot be implemented (i.e. 
additional audit procedures, additional disclosures, and possibly even dismissing the 
client).  Audit failures leave auditors open to lawsuits and erode the public trust in the 
profession.  Therefore, adequate risk identification is absolutely essential to the 
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successful completion of the audit.  “Despite the importance of risk identification in 
practice, this task has received little attention in the auditing literature” (Bedard and 
Graham 2002, 40).   
The current study contributes to the audit literature by examining differences in 
the identification of financial versus business risks in a RBA environment.  As discussed 
in the previous section, the RBA approach focuses not only on financial statement risks 
that have traditionally been a part of the audit, but also on business risks that deal with 
the strategic position of the client.  By investigating risk identification in the RBA 
context, I can speak to differences in ability related to financial and business risks.  If 
ability is not as well developed for some risk analyses, then I can begin to address ways 
to improve auditor performance in these areas.   
Risk identification involves bringing together many factors from memory and 
other information sources, while risk assessment involves only weighting these factors 
(Bedard and Graham 2002).  For this reason, identification of risks is a much more 
difficult task than risk assessment.  Without knowledge structures in place, the 
identification of risks is extremely difficult or even impossible.  Therefore, differences in 
auditor ability to identify the different types of risks indicate that knowledge is not as 
well developed for one of the two risk types.     
I expect that auditors have differing ability related to the assessment and 
identification of these two risk types due to more developed knowledge of financial risks 
compared to business risks.  Although RBA stresses the importance of identifying 
business risks, I believe that auditors will perform significantly better when identifying 
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financial risks.  This is because they have developed the relevant knowledge related to 
financial risks, but not business risks.  There are two reasons for this:  better preparation 
and better guidance. 
Auditors have had exposure to financial risks for many years, even at an early 
stage in their careers, due to their academic preparation.  Audit and accounting textbooks 
and classes generally focus on financial risks.  Audit classes cover topics such as 
financial statement assertions, the audit of account balances, and tests of controls.   In 
other accounting classes, the relationships between the accounts and the financial 
statements are explained so that auditors can identify unusual fluctuations in accounts.  
While strategy classes in management are also part of a business curriculum and address 
areas that would include business risks, accounting students have had significantly more 
exposure to financial risks through the sheer number of accounting classes required.  
Additionally, there is little regulatory guidance in the area of business risk 
identification.  Auditing guides discuss the financial assertions, risks related to each 
assertion, and how to test these assertions, and they sometimes describe required auditing 
procedures.  Traditional auditing standards do not address strategic business risks 
directly.  Evaluating client strategy in the form of business risks is somewhat an “art,” 
and definitive guidance in this area is not available. With definite rules related to what is 
expected from the auditor related to the financial risks, and with little guidance on 
business risks, auditors are more likely to focus on the areas related to the financial 
statements.  For these reasons, auditors would not be expected to have well-developed 
knowledge structures related to business risks early in their auditing career.  Based on 
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this, I propose that the identification of financial risks will be easier for auditors than the 
identification of business risks.  
H1:  Auditors will identify more financial risks than business risks, 
ceteris paribus. 
The purpose of hypothesis H1 is to test expectations about the quality of auditors’ 
knowledge structures.  If hypothesis H1 is supported, I conclude that auditors have more 
well-developed knowledge structures related to financial risks than business risks.  
Assuming this is true, there are implications related to how improved performance on risk 
analysis can be achieved for financial risks compared to business risks.  The next sections 
address these implications and offer hypotheses with respect to improving risk analysis.     
Time Pressure 
 
Research on the effects of time pressure on auditors is of interest because auditors 
always work in a time constrained environment in order to meet deadlines set by 
regulatory agencies, clients, and other stakeholders.  Additionally, audit personnel create 
internal deadlines and budgets in order to ensure they meet external deadlines, as well as 
manage the efficiency of their jobs.  There are two types of time pressure: time limit 
pressure and time budget pressure.  According to DeZoort and Lord (1997), these are 
related but independent constructs.  Previous studies have looked at both types of time 
pressure and the effect on accountants, generally finding that moderate amounts of time 
pressure can sometimes be beneficial, while extreme pressure is always detrimental 
(Asare et al. 2000; Braun 2000; Kelley and Margheim 1990; Kelley and Seiler 1982; 
Kermis and Mahapatra 1985; Lightner et al. 1982; Marxen 1990; McDaniel 1990; 
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Ponemon 1992).  Extreme time pressure leads to dysfunctional behaviors including 
improper completion of audit tests, premature sign-off, under-reporting of hours worked, 
and job stress resulting in employee turnover (Asare et al. 2000; Braun 2000; Kelley and 
Margheim 1990; Kelley and Seiler 1982; Kermis and Mahapatra 1985; Lightner et al. 
1982; Marxen 1990; McDaniel 1990; Ponemon 1992).   
The extant literature finds that time pressure motivates auditors so that 
performance is a concave function of increased pressure.  This is known as the “inverted-
U” theory (DeZoort and Lord 1997)4.  The basic finding is that small and moderate levels 
of pressure tend to create increases in performance.  At some point, the pressure becomes 
great enough so that it causes dysfunctional behaviors resulting in decreased 
performance.  In the current study, I do not study pressures that are extreme or past the 
inflection point for peak performance.  My objective is to focus on moderate amounts of 
budget pressure. 
In this study, I address budget constraints within a RBA environment.  I ask 
auditors to make risk analysis decisions under differing budget constraints.  My research 
looks at how these estimates of future constraints influence the current tasks of audit risk 
analysis.  Limited audit research has looked at how constraints on resources in the future 
affect the decisions made by auditors in the present (Low 2004).  One possibility is that 
knowledge of future limitations on a resource will change current decisions in a negative 
manner.  Predecisional distortion theory would predict that if auditors have a specified 
number of budgeted hours in mind, this cognition affects their subsequent decisions 
                                                 
4 This is also known as the Yerkes-Dodson effect. 
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(Russo et al. 1996; Russo et al. 1998; Russo et al. 2000; Wilks 2002).  When budget 
constraints are extreme, I would expect that auditor cognitions about the risks would be 
changed.  Prior work has shown that extreme pressures often lead to dysfunctional 
behaviors, and the changing of risk assessments based on budget pressures could be 
detrimental to the audit (DeZoort and Lord 1997; Kelley and Margheim 1990; Kelley and 
Seiler 1982; Kermis and Mahapatra 1985; Lightner et al. 1982; Marxen 1990; McDaniel 
1990; Ponemon 1992).  The current study however, addresses moderate budget 
constraints.  Given this, I expect that auditors will not feel extreme levels of pressure that 
could drive them to make poor decisions.  Instead, I expect that budget pressure will have 
a motivating effect. 
The positive effects of budgets can occur via two possible routes.  The first route 
is through the motivational effects of accepting a more difficult goal.  The second route is 
the elicitation of more effective task strategies such as working faster or filtering out less 
relevant information.  The following sections lay out the theory for each of these routes 
and hypothesize relationships applicable to the theory. 
Budget Constraints as a Goal 
 
Goals in the form of budget constraints can motivate auditors and lead to 
enhanced performance.  Performance on work tasks is an increasing function of the 
difficulty of an individual’s goals (Durham et al. 2000; Latham 2000; Locke 2000; Locke 
and Latham 2002).  In general, more difficult goals lead to greater effort and improved 
performance.  Peters et al. (1984) find that time pressure and budget constraints affect 
performance through their influence on goal difficulty.  In other words, difficult goals 
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mediate the effects of time pressure on performance (Peters et al. 1984).  Their findings 
related to time pressure are consistent with other work in the psychology literature 
showing that a more difficult goal often leads to increased performance.   
Goals are energizing (Locke and Latham 2002).  This means that more difficult 
goals will lead to greater effort than less difficult goals (Locke and Latham 2002).  
Simply by providing a more difficult goal, individuals are encouraged to put forth more 
effort toward the task at hand.  Therefore, providing auditor participants with a difficult 
goal of meeting more stringent budget constraints will likely lead to greater effort on the 
part of these auditors.  As the auditors put forth more effort on the task, judgments about 
audit risks should improve. 
Next, goals affect persistence and intensity (Locke and Latham 2002).  This 
means more difficult goals will usually result in effort over a longer period of time and/or 
greater effort intensity (Peters et al. 1984).  In the current situation, the participants are 
given different budgets in which they are expected to complete the audit.  The budget 
limits the ability to expend effort over a longer period of time; therefore the expectation 
is that participants in this study will show greater effort intensity.  Through increased 
attention to the task at hand, auditors with a more difficult budget constraint will perform 
better than other auditors who are given a less difficult budget constraint.   
Finally, goals lead to discovery of task-relevant strategies (Locke and Latham 
2002).  The goal literature has found that goals affect performance indirectly through 
arousal, discovery, and task-relevant strategies (Locke and Latham 2002).  This means 
that when an individual has previous knowledge he or she will apply it to the situation.  
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In cases where the individual does not have direct experience, he or she will develop a 
plan and will draw on prior skill sets to try to develop appropriate strategies for the 
current task.   
The energizing effects of providing a more difficult goal in the form of budget 
constraints should lead to greater motivation on the part of auditors.  Given a more 
difficult goal, the intensity of effort is increased as well as the discovery of relevant 
strategies. The combination of these factors should ultimately result in better decisions 
related to audit risks.   
Time Pressure and Coping Strategies 
 
When auditors experience time pressure they can react in a variety of ways.  It has 
been suggested that there are three responses to time pressure: (1) working faster, (2) 
filtering information, and (3) using “simple, non-linear” decision strategies (Durham et 
al. 2000; Payne et al. 1993).  While the first two strategies are effective, the third strategy 
is not.  Working faster is not an appropriate strategy in the current context because the 
budget pressure occurs in the future (although auditors may plan to work faster during the 
actual audit of these risk areas).  Auditors could respond to the increased budget pressure 
in a less effective manner by choosing a heuristic decision strategy.  This change in 
strategy to a “simple, non-linear method” is even more likely in certain instances.  For 
example, when tasks are overly complex or auditors do not have the required ability, they 
will be more likely to use the ineffective strategy5 (Payne et al. 1993).   
                                                 
5 The assessment of audit risks is a complex audit task.  In the current study, however, task complexity is 
held constant within each experiment, therefore task complexity effects are not examined within the context 
of the current study. 
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Instead, a filtering technique where the auditor addresses the most relevant 
information related risks is the only effective response in the context of the audit risk 
decisions addressed in this study.  Filtration is an effective strategy because it forces 
auditors to be more judicious about the information that they consider (Ariely and Zakay 
2001).  When irrelevant information is considered, judgments tend to be less accurate due 
to the dilution effect6 (Nisbett et al. 1981).  Prior studies have found that time pressure 
ameliorates the effects of irrelevant information because auditors filter it out (McDaniel 
1990, Glover 1997, Payne et al. 1988).  By selecting the most relevant information, 
auditors are more likely to make better decisions regarding audit risks.     
Budget Constraints and Risk Identification 
 In the preceding section, I predict that auditors will identify more financial risks 
than business risks because they have greater knowledge structures related to financial 
risks.  Audit risks should be identified regardless of the time budget allocations, because 
a failure to identify risks means they cannot be controlled.  Auditors understand the 
importance of risk identification; therefore I expect that limits on risk identification stem 
from ability and not from externally imposed factors.  In other words, auditors cannot 
identify risks if they do not have ability; however, they will identify all risks that they are 
capable of recognizing because of the implications for the audit.  Therefore, I do not 
expect budget constraints to affect identification, although this expectation is not known.  
To test this, I predict the following, stated in the null form:   
                                                 
6 Usually irrelevant information has a moderating effect on judgments so that decisions make with 
irrelevant information are less extreme both in a positive and negative direction.  Therefore, under dilution 
theory, decisions will tend toward a middle ground when irrelevant information is considered. 
 17
H2:  Budget constraints do not affect risk identification accuracy for 
financial risks or business risks. 7
Budget Constraints and Risk Assessment 
As a task becomes more complex, the individual completing the task will need 
more ability in order to complete it successfully.  Complex tasks are those that have more 
components or informational cues and require more coordination of the separate pieces 
that make up the overall task (Bonner 1994).  The processing of client information and 
the assessment of audit risks are very complex tasks because there are numerous cues, 
and these cues must be interpreted in combination with one another.  Therefore, auditor 
ability is an important consideration when addressing risk assessment.   
Ability moderates the effect of goals.  In order for an individual, like an auditor, 
to act on a specific goal, he must have the ability to do so.  Without the ability to act in a 
manner to accomplish the goal, the goal will be perceived as a threat.  When goals are 
perceived to be a threat, performance decreases (Drach-Zahavy and Erez 2002).  In fact, 
goals that are too difficult due to lack of ability will often have the effect of the individual 
simply “giving up” (Durham et al. 2000).  Since I expect auditors to have less ability with 
respect to business risks, goals related to these risks will be viewed as a threat unless 
auditor ability can be improved. 
Ability also influences the selection of coping strategies used to deal with 
perceived time pressure.  In order to successfully make determinations about audit risks 
                                                 
7 Producing a number of risks is not as important as producing a listing of risks that accurately measures the 
audit risks to the client, both financial and business.  In order to benchmark the accuracy of the risks, the 
listing prepared by participants in the study is compared to those of partner experts. 
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under time pressure, auditors must have cognitive structures in place that will allow them 
to effectively filter information as a coping strategy.  While I predict that auditors have 
these cognitive structures for financial risks, I do not expect them to be in place for 
business risks.  Cognitive load occurs when complex tasks, such as risk assessment, are 
performed in the absence of the appropriate cognitive structures (Mousavi et al. 1995).  
Based on the premise that auditors have less ability related to business risks, I expect 
business risk assessment to produce significant cognitive load, negating information 
filtering as a beneficial coping strategy -- unless auditor ability can be improved. 
Assuming that knowledge structures are well developed for financial risks as 
indicated by hypothesis H1, it can be inferred that auditors have ability related to 
financial risks.  With this ability, I expect that goals should have a positive effect on 
financial risk assessments.  Additionally, this would imply that when faced with budget 
pressure, auditors act in an adaptive manner (e.g. filtration), rather than a non-adaptive 
one.  Therefore financial risk assessments are expected to be improved when auditors are 
given more stringent budget constraints. 
H3a:  More stringent budget constraints increase the accuracy of financial 
risk assessments. 
I expect that auditor ability related to business risk assessments is not as well 
developed as financial risk ability.  For this reason, budget constraints are unlikely to 
have a positive effect on business risk assessments and could possibly even have a 
negative effect (Drach-Zahavy and Erez 2002).  Since business risks are key to the RBA 
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approach, finding ways to improve auditor ability in this area can make risk based audits 
much more effective.  I now discuss one way that auditor ability can be enhanced. 
Enhancing Ability through a Decision Aid 
 
Many audit studies have found that decision aids improve accounting judgments 
in a variety of tasks (Ashton 1974; Ashton and Brown 1980; Eining et al. 1997; Glover et 
al. 1997; Rose and Wolfe 2000; Whitecotton and Butler 1998).  Prior research has also 
shown that some decision aids can decrease cognitive load and aid performance (Rose 
and Wolfe 2000).   Decision aids offer structure to the decision process, and structure has 
been shown in the psychology literature to improve decision-making (MacGregor et al. 
1988; Slovic et al. 1977).  The use of a structured task ensures that people are less likely 
to become overwhelmed and rely on simple heuristics to make decisions (Armstrong et 
al. 1975).  Therefore, the use of a non-deterministic decision aid may substitute for the 
lack of cognitive structures to organize decisions about audit risks. 
The structuring method proposed in this study is based on the multi-attribute 
utility theory (MAUT).  This method calls for complex decisions to be addressed as 
separate parts or attributes.  These separate attributes represent the values that are 
important to the overall decision.  MAUT formally describes the decision evaluation as: 
 
MAU = Σ wiuij         (1) 
Where  
w= weight of the ith attribute  
u= utility of the attribute 
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Once the separate attributes have been assessed and weighted, the individual sums of all 
of the attributes together determine total utility and identify the best alternative (Slovic et 
al. 1977).  Use of a decision process based on MAUT has been found to help people 
focus on important issues, feel more comfortable with their decisions, and provide more 
thoughtful and higher quality decisions (Ariely and Zakay 2001; Arvai et al. 2001).   
In order to facilitate improved risk assessments, I develop a simple, non-
deterministic decision aid based on MAUT as well as literature from two Big Five 
auditing guides8.  This decision aid requires the auditors to assess each risk on two 
relevant attributes.  The first is the significance or magnitude of the risk.  The second is 
the likelihood of that risk to occur.  Auditors plot the evaluations of each risk attribute on 
a grid that approximates the summation suggested by MAUT9 (see Appendix M).  By 
breaking the risk assessment down into two separate attributes that have relevance to the 
current risk decision, cognitive load is reduced and the auditors can better evaluate the 
overall risk.   
When auditors use a decision aid to reduce cognitive load and structure their 
decisions related to business risks, then goal theory predicts that more difficult goals 
produce better performance.  Also, with increased ability, when auditors perceive more 
budget pressure, a beneficial adaptation should lead to improved performance.  With a 
decision aid to proxy for ability, I expect budget constraints to produce better business 
                                                 
8 By non-deterministic, I mean that the decision aid does not offer a final solution.  The decision aid simply 
provides the structure in which the auditor makes the decision. 
9 Plotting the risk attributes on a grid approximates the summation suggested by theory only if the attributes 
are of equal weight.  My review of the audit documentation of two Big Five firms indicates consideration 
of these attributes.  Both firms suggest picturing these attributes on two axes.  One firm required formal 
evaluation on this type of grid.  Based on these graphic depictions and reading of the firm materials, I 
surmise that these attributes should be weighted equally. 
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risk assessments through goal induced motivation and/or a positive adaptation to 
perceived time pressure.  I propose the following relationship10: 
H3b:  Decision aid use combined with a more stringent budget increases the 
accuracy of business risk assessments. 
How Performance is Improved 
 When auditors have relevant knowledge related to financial risks, budget 
constraints are expected to improve performance (H3a). Also, when auditors have a 
decision aid, business risk assessments related to the audit are expected to be more 
accurate (H3b).  In the process of developing these predictions, I introduce two possible 
routes to explain task improvement.  The first is goal theory that predicts the energizing 
and motivating aspects of a more difficult goal lead to improved performance.  The 
second is a time pressure adaptation perspective.  As an individual perceives more budget 
pressure (regardless of whether there is actually increased pressure), they can react 
adaptively by working faster or filtering information.   
 The test of hypotheses H3a and H3b determines if the stringent budget interacts 
with auditor ability to produce improved performance.  It does not allow me to determine, 
however, whether the budget constraint directly affects performance or if it affects 
performance by inducing budget pressure.  I make predictions about the effects of these 
two cognitive routes only when auditors have ability (i.e. when the auditor is assessing 
                                                 
10 It can be argued that risk identification would also be improved by use of a decision aid and that this 
relationship should be hypothesized for risk identification also.  Risk identification does not easily lend 
itself to use of a decision aid because any such aid would seemingly have to list out possible risks; 
therefore, this would defeat the purpose of testing risk identification.  Since risk identification has received 
little attention in the literature to date (Bedard and Graham 2002), this study is meant to be exploratory in 
the area of risk identification.  
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financial risks and when the auditor has a decision aid to help assess business risks).  
Budget constraints could be partially or fully mediated by budget pressure perceptions. 
Another alternative is that both of these routes improve performance independently.  
Prior research has shown that both the goal route and time pressure route can lead to 
improved performance.  Based on this, I predict that auditor performance is improved via 
both routes.  I predict: 
H4a:  Stringent time constraints improve financial risk assessments in 
two ways: (a) directly through a goal effect, and (b) indirectly through 
perceived budget pressure. 
H4b:  When auditors use a decision aid, stringent time constraints 
improve business risk assessments in two ways: (a) directly through a goal 
effect, and (b) indirectly through perceived budget pressure. 
Summary 
The preceding sections outlined the basis for my experimental hypotheses.  I 
contend that auditors are better able to identify financial risks for the audit than business 
risks.  Auditors are able to better identify these risks because they have more developed 
knowledge related to financial risks due to more regulatory guidance and more coverage 
during their academic careers.  Since business risks are an important part of the RBA 
approach, the inability to perform risk analysis related to these types of risks is a 
limitation worthy of study.  Since I believe that auditors lack ability related to business 
risk analysis, I advocate the use of a non-deterministic decision aid to substitute for 
ability.  When auditors have adequate ability, I predict that the motivational aspects of 
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goals and the use of adaptive time pressure strategies are the cognitive methods by which 
performance is improved. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were 142 experienced audit seniors employed by one Big Four 
accounting firm.  This firm uses an RBA approach, but does not use a decision aid to 
structure risk assessments.  The participants were enrolled in a national firm training 
course for auditors at this experience level.  Within the RBA approach, auditors are 
involved in the risk identification and audit test design stages at an early part of their 
careers (Bell et al. 1997). As a result, a senior has some experience with risk analysis 
procedures.  Additionally, audit seniors bear the bulk of the responsibility for meeting the 
audit budget; therefore, these auditors were appropriate subjects for this study (Houston 
1999; Kelley and Seiler 1982).  The use of one firm is important as it allows me to hold 
constant the training and methodology used at the firm that might otherwise add error 
variance to my measures.  Approximately 850 auditors attended this national training, of 
which 150 were assigned to participate in this study.  The experiment was designed for 
the one-hour time allotted during the training by the participating firm.  Two partners at 
the firm reviewed the materials to ensure they were appropriate and that the task could be 
completed within the allotted time. 
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Task 
 The experimental tasks involved reading planning materials for a hypothetical 
audit client11.  The materials consisted of information about the client industry including 
excerpts from a trade journal.  In addition, there was a brief description of the company 
similar to what would be included in the Management, Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) 
section of a form 10-K.  Finally, financial statements were provided.  I used a 
manufacturing client for the hypothetical company.  The advantage to using a 
manufacturing client was that experimental participants were familiar with this type of 
client due to at least some exposure during their schooling.  In addition, prior studies 
have found that when an auditor does not have specific industry knowledge, they usually 
rely on their knowledge of a familiar industry, such as the manufacturing industry (Taylor 
2002).  
 My hypotheses are tested in two separate but related experiments.  For 
Experiment One, the auditors are asked to provide a listing of audit risks for the manager 
on the engagement.  After listing the audit risks, the auditors made risk assessments and 
assigned audit hours. 12  For Experiment Two, auditors were provided with a listing of 
audit risks that had been prepared by two partners working for this particular Big Four 
firm.  These auditors were asked to read the materials and provide a risk assessment for 
each risk listed as well as estimate the hours it would take to audit that risk.   
 
 
                                                 
11 The planning materials including the financial statements and MD&A were based on a small 
manufacturing company that is publicly traded on the NASDAQ.  The information is publicly available 
through the Securities Exchange Commission annual and quarterly filings. 
12 A risk assessment is the prioritization of audit risks as high, medium or low.   
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Design and Procedures 
 
Experiment One 
 
 Experiment One investigated the effects of budget constraints on risk 
identification in a RBA environment.  In the introduction of the experimental materials, 
the total budgeted hours were set equal to either 450 (stringent budget constraints 
condition) or 600 (non-stringent time constraints condition) hours.  Auditors read 
experimental materials presented in a booklet titled “Company Information.”  Finally, the 
auditors provided a listing of risks that should be considered for the audit.  For each risk 
identified, the auditor also provided a risk assessment and an initial estimate of hours to 
be assigned to audit the risk.   
A schematic of the experimental procedures described below for Experiment One 
can be found in Figure 1. 
1. An administrator was assigned to each training room.  The administrator read a 
short script explaining the experiment (Appendix A).  The administrator then 
passed out manila envelopes containing the experimental materials.  The manila 
envelopes were randomized, such that each auditor had equal chance to receive 
either of the two treatments13. 
2. Within each envelope were several stapled packets and the information sheet 
required by the institutional review board (IRB).  The instructions asked that the 
packets be completed in a specified order.  The first page was an instruction 
                                                 
13 In addition to having an equal chance of receiving either of these two treatments, materials from 
experiment one and two were randomly assigned to each room.  Therefore, all subjects had an equal chance 
of receiving any of the total of six treatments across the two experiments. 
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sheet detailing the completion of the experiment and describing all of the 
packets contained in the manila envelope (Appendix B). 
3. The first packet contained a demographic questionnaire (Appendix C) and a 
page describing the experimental task followed (Appendix D).  This required 
the auditors to read the second packet containing information about the 
hypothetical client and industry (Appendix E and Appendix F) and the third 
packet containing the risk identification template (Appendix G) on which the 
auditor listed the risks that they identified.  In addition to identifying the risks, 
the auditor also provided a risk assessment on a seven-point Lickert scale and 
wrote the number of hours that they would budget for that audit area.  Auditors 
were instructed to identify and document risks based upon the company 
information provided and to view this information while identifying and 
assessing audit risks. 
4. Auditors reviewed the company information and documented the relevant audit 
risks in the provided template, including a reconciliation of the total estimated 
hours in the audit (Appendix H). 
5. A short questionnaire, the last step in the experiment, asked the auditors how 
useful the various forms of company information were in helping to identify and 
assess the risks and included manipulation check questions (Appendix I). 
6. Once all of the information was completed, the auditors placed their materials in 
the large manila envelopes and returned them to the room administrator.  When 
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all of the envelopes were collected, the auditors were thanked for their time and 
the experiment was ended. 
 
Figure 1. 
Experiment One Procedures 
 
 
Administrators read a short script and 
experimental materials are passed out in manila 
envelopes. 
 
Auditors read the first packet and complete demographic information about 
themselves and the jobs on which they work.  They also read a page describing 
the risk identification task including containing the manipulated budget hours 
for their treatment. 
 
Auditors read the company materials provided. 
 
Auditors identify risks and document them in the risk template.  
They also assess each risk and assign hours to audit each risk. 
 
Auditors answer questions regarding materials used to 
develop risks and complete manipulation checks. 
 
Administrators collect materials and thank subjects at the end of 
the one-hour session.  
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Experiment Two 
 
Experiment Two was a 2 x 2 between subjects design that manipulated budget 
constraints (stringent vs. non-stringent) and decision aid use (decision aid vs. no decision 
aid).  Budget constraints were manipulated in the introduction of the case scenario so that 
the total budgeted hours were set equal to either 450 (stringent budget constraints 
condition) or 600 (non stringent budget constraints condition) hours.   
Decision aid use was manipulated by providing a decision aid or asking auditors 
to make unaided decisions.   In the decision aid treatments, the auditor was instructed to 
prioritize the risks on two axes of a grid.  One axis represented the attribute “significance 
of the risk” (e.g. materiality), and the other represented the attribute “likelihood of 
occurrence”14 (Appendix N).  Auditors assessed each risk on a continuum of low-to-high 
for each of these attributes.  After assessing each attribute on the related axis, the auditor 
looked for the intersection of these two points to determine the overall risk assessment.  
Auditors were instructed that risks that were high on both significance and likelihood 
should be classified as a 6 or 7 on the Lickert scale.  If the risks were low on both 
significance and likelihood, they were classified as a 1 or 2 on the Lickert scale.  A 
combination of high and low produced a medium risk, and was classified as 3, 4, or 5 on 
the Lickert scale. 
In the no decision aid treatments, the auditor was simply asked to determine the 
severity of the risk on a seven-point Lickert scale.  The auditors circled a judgmental 
                                                 
14 These constructs were noted during review of audit handbooks of two Big Five audit firms. 
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evaluation of their risk assessment on the risk template that represented their overall 
assessment of that particular risk. 
In the Experiment Two materials, the risk areas were already identified and typed 
into a template for the auditor to review.  The identified risks were provided by two 
partners (hereafter “partner experts”) working at the participating Big Four firm who 
reviewed the same materials as the experimental participants.  The two partner experts 
agreed to a list of eleven financial and business risks for the hypothetical company and 
also provided ratings of the importance of each risk.   
Providing the list of risks to the auditor participants in the same order provides 
opportunity for order effects to skew my results.  In order to address this threat to the 
internal validity of my results, I randomized the list of risk into different orders, so that 
no auditors in the same treatment would have the same risk ordering. It is important to 
note that in Experiment Two auditors did not identify risks; instead they provided the risk 
assessments on a seven-point Lickert scale.   
A schematic of the experimental procedures for Experiment Two can be found in 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. 
Experiment Two Procedures 
 
 
Administrators read a short script and 
experimental materials are passed out in manila 
envelopes. 
 
Auditors read the first packet and complete demographic information about 
themselves and the jobs on which they work.  They also read a page describing 
the risk assessment task including containing the manipulated budget hours for 
their treatment. 
 
Auditors read the company materials provided. 
 
Auditors have been provided with a list of identified risks. 
       
 
Auditors in the no decision aid 
treatments make unaided judgments 
about the risk assessments on a 
seven-point Lickert scale. 
 
Auditors in the decision aid 
treatments assess risk using a 
template for likelihood and severity 
and make final assessments on a 
seven- point Lickert scale. 
          
    
Administrators collect materials and thank subjects at the end of 
the one-hour session.  
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1. An administrator was assigned to each training room.  The administrator read a 
short script explaining the experiment (Appendix A).  The administrator then 
passed out manila envelopes containing the experimental materials.  The manila 
envelopes were randomized, such that each auditor has equal chance to receive 
any treatment.15 
2. Within each envelope were several stapled packets of paper and an Information 
Sheet required by the IRB.  The first page was an instruction sheet detailing the 
completion of the experiment and the materials included (Appendix J for 
Decision Aid treatments and Appendix K for No Decision Aid treatments). 
3. The first packet included a demographic questionnaire (Appendix C).  Once this 
was completed, the following page included a description of the experimental 
task including the manipulated budget hours (Appendix L).  The task involved 
reviewing the risk listing (Appendix M) and the company and industry 
information packet (Appendix E and Appendix F) provided in the manila 
envelope.  The risks listed were provided by partner experts.  The list of risks 
was in a template that required circling a risk assessment and providing estimated 
budget hours for each risk.  The risk assessments were made on a seven-point 
Lickert scale ranging from Very Low to Very High.  The budgeted hours were a 
written estimate of hours provided by the auditor participant for each risk area. 
                                                 
15 In addition to having an equal chance of receiving any of these four treatments, materials from 
experiment one and two were randomly assigned to each room.  Therefore, all subjects had an equal 
chance of receiving any of the total of six treatments across the two experiments. 
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4. Half of the participants in this experiment received treatments that involved 
decision aid use as part of the risk assessment decision.  For these auditors there 
were additional steps in their instructions that asked them to use a decision aid to 
classify the risks on the seven-point Lickert scale.  The decision aid and 
instructions were included with the materials for these treatments (Appendix N).  
5. A short questionnaire followed with instructions to complete it last.  It asked the 
auditors how useful the various forms of company information were in helping to 
identify and assess the risks and included manipulation check questions.  
(Appendix I). 
6. Once all of the information was completed, the auditors placed the materials in 
the large manila envelopes and returned them to the room administrator.  When 
all of the envelopes were collected, the auditors were thanked for their time and 
the experiment was ended.  
Variables Operationalized, Functional Relationships and Statistical Tests 
My first hypothesis tests for differences in auditor ability to identify financial 
risks versus business risks.  To formally test hypothesis H1, I performed a Z test for 
equality of population proportions.  My two proportions included the proportion of 
correctly identified risks for both financial and business risks.  This test allows me to 
compare two binomial proportions.  The statistic for this test was computed using a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet for the following equation (Ott and Longnecker 2001): 
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Z =  (πfinancial – πbusiness)  
((πfinancial(1-πfinancial)/nfinancial)+(πbusiness(1-πbusiness)/nbusiness)) (2) 
 
where 
πfinancial= the sample proportion of financial risks identified 
πbusiness= the sample proportion of business risks identified 
nfinancial= the sample size  
nbusiness= the sample size 
 
The second hypothesis tests for differences in the proportion of risks correctly 
identified under stringent budget constraints compared to less stringent budget 
constraints.  The data collected consisted of the identified audit risks and the 
demographic information.  Auditor participants in Experiment One returned 50 
packages.  Two of these packages were not completed with actual business or financial 
risks, giving a total of 48 usable responses.   
Responses were coded by the author and one independent coder16.  Responses 
were compared to the listing of risks provided by the partner experts.  Each of the eleven 
risks identified by the partners was checked against the list provided by the auditors and 
coded for inclusion.  The number of risks correctly identified by the auditors for both 
financial and business risks was summed to produce a score for that participant (i.e. a 
score for financial risks and another score for business risk).17  This score was scaled by 
the total number of financial and business risks identified by the partner experts to 
                                                 
16 The independent coder had two years of public accounting work experience and was therefore familiar 
with terminology.   
17 A risk was considered “correct” if it matched a risk identified by the partner experts. 
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produce the “scaled score.”  The author and independent rater agreed on classification 
for 89.39% of the items.  Differences were resolved through discussion by the author 
and the coder.  The resolved differences were then reviewed by a third individual with 
10 years of accounting, auditing and SEC reporting experience and with experience in 
the industry used in the case study.   
  Scaled scores for financial and business risks were analyzed in a repeated-
measures-ANCOVA (Analysis of Covariance) analyzing risk type, budget constraints, 
and experience.  This model provided a test for hypothesis H2.  The functional 
relationship for this test is as follows: 
Score = f (Risk Type, Budget Constraint, Experience)  (3) 
Where: 
Score is the proportion of risks correctly identified by each participant 
compared to the partner experts. 
Risk Type is the designation of the repeated measure for each participant as 
either the business risks or the financial risks. 
Budget Constraint is a binary response variable coded as 1 if the participant 
was in the 450 hour budget constraint treatment and coded 0 if they were 
in the 600 hour budget constraint treatment. 
Experience is measured in months of experience. 
 Participants in Experiment Two returned 100 packages.  Six packages had to be 
discarded because the participants were unable to complete the questions.  This provided 
94 usable responses for analysis.  Data collected for Experiment Two was benchmarked 
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against expert assessments prepared by the two partner experts at the participating firm. 
Experiment Two provided data to test my third hypothesis and investigates whether a 
decision aid used in combination with a more stringent goal can improve risk 
assessments.  The difference in responses between the experts and the participants was 
tested in the following functional relationship using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
methods: 
Difference Measure = f (Budget Constraint, Decision Aid Use, Experience)     (4) 
Where: 
Difference Measure is risk assessment difference which is the difference of 
the auditor participant and the firm expert assessments for business risks 
and for financial risks.  In my analysis I provide relative, absolute, and 
squared differences. 
Budget Constraint is a binary response variable coded as 1 if the participant 
was in the 450 hour budget constraint treatment and coded 0 if they were 
in the 600 hour budget constraint treatment (manipulated variable). 
Decision Aid Use is a binary response variable coded “1” when the decision 
aid was used and “0” when it was not (manipulated variable). 
Experience is measured in months of experience. 
The final set of hypotheses tests the routes by which performance on a business 
risk assessment may be improved.  These relationships are tested via path analysis.  Path 
analysis predicts more than one dependent variable and is also concerned with the 
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ordering of the variables.  Path coefficients are estimated using multiple regression and 
estimating the parameters for each dependent variable (Klem 2001). 
In the path model used for this study, there are two dependent variables (See 
Figure 3).  First, I predict Perceived Budget Pressure.  Next, I predict the difference 
measure for both the financial and business risk assessments.  I include experience and 
perceived need for additional time as covariates.  I expect the Budget Constraint and 
Perceived Budget Pressure variables will predict my business risk difference measures.  
These paths are hypothesized.  Additional paths in the model are tested, but I do not 
formally hypothesize these paths.  Refer to Figure 3 for a schematic of these 
relationships. 
Manipulation Checks 
 In order to assess whether the auditor participants understood the parameters of 
the experiment, participants were asked about the hours allocated to them for the budget.  
They were also asked how many hours the manager said that the previous auditors used 
for the audit.  Six of the auditor participants did not answer these questions correctly.  
Dropping them from the analysis does not change results; therefore they are left in the 
sample. 
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Figure 3. 
 
Proposed Path Analysis Model 
 
 Perceived Need for 
Additional Time 
Experience 
(months) 
Difference Measure of 
Financial Risk 
Assessment 
 
 Budget 
Constraint 
Perceived Budget 
Pressure 
Difference Measure of 
Business Risk 
Assessment 
Dashed lines represent relationships tested for mediation.  These relationships are not predicted. 
Bold solid lines represent hypothesized relationships. 
Thin solid lines represent expected relationships that are not formally hypothesized. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 Two experiments were performed to test the experimental hypotheses.  
Experiment One explored differences in auditor ability to identify financial versus 
business risks for the audit.  Experiment Two investigated the use of goals in the form of 
budget constraints to improve auditor performance related to risk assessments.  The 
results of each experiment follow. 
Experiment One 
 
 Descriptive statistics showed that business risks identified by the partner experts 
were much less likely to be identified by the audit seniors regardless of months of 
experience or budget constraints.  On average, audit seniors identified only about 16 
percent of the business risks predetermined by the partner experts, and no participant 
identified all of the business risks.  In fact, the largest number of risks identified was 2 of 
the 5 risks, and only 10 audit seniors performed this well.  Nineteen of the audit seniors 
did not correctly identify any business risks at all.  Audit seniors identified, on average, 
59 percent of the financial statement risks, and 23 percent of the auditors (11of 48) 
identified either 5 or 6 of the 6 financial risks.  Only one participant was unable to 
correctly identify any of the financial risks.  The percentage correctly identified for each 
risk is shown in Table 2.  Hypothesis H1 states that auditors will identify more financial 
risks than business risks, ceteris paribus.  These descriptive statistics support hypothesis 
H1, indicating that the financial statement risk identification processes are much better 
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developed than those for business risk identification.  These descriptive statistics, 
however, do not provide a formal test.  
Table 2. 
Percentage of Audit Seniors Correctly Identifying Each Risk 
Risk Name Percent Risk Type 
The Company’s environmental policies and 
procedures do not adequately prevent environmental 
issues. 
37.5 Business 
Insufficient R&D spending resulting in declining 
product performance and acceptability. 
33.3 Business 
Inability to purchase necessary components of 
inventory from suppliers. 
8.3 Business 
Technical support services are inadequate to ensure 
customer satisfaction. 
2.1 Business 
Compensation insufficient to retain competent 
personnel. 
0.0 Business 
Inadequate inventory reserves due to obsolescence 
and declining market conditions. 
87.5 Financial 
Collectibility of receivables due to insufficient credit 
extension policies to new and existing customers. 
75.0 Financial 
Inadequate policies and procedures over deferred 
revenue resulting in misstated sales. 
75.0 Financial 
Inadequate warranty reserves established for 
products sold under warranty. 
52.1 Financial 
Inaccurate valuation of investments. 47.9 Financial 
Significant profits will not be earned to recover 
investment in property, plant & equipment. 
16.7 Financial 
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To formally test hypothesis H1, I performed a Z test for equality of population 
proportions (Ott and Longnecker 2001)18.  I included the proportions of correctly 
identified risks for both business and financial statement risks.  The Z-score was -4.82; 
therefore, I reject the null hypothesis that these two population proportions are equal.  In 
support of hypothesis H1, I conclude that the proportion of financial statement risks 
identified is significantly greater than the proportion of business risks identified.19 The 
results related to hypothesis H1 indicate that audit seniors are better able to identify 
financial risks than business risks.  The RBA approach relies heavily on identification of 
both financial and business risks.  Finding that business risk identification is not as well 
developed implies that the RBA approach may not achieve its theoretical potential.  
Firms wanting to use this type of audit approach should focus on ways to improve 
business risk identification skills in order to ensure an effective audit. 
My second hypothesis, H2, predicts that budget constraints will not affect 
auditor’s identification of financial risks or business risks.  To test this hypothesis, scaled 
scores20 were analyzed in a “repeated measures” ANCOVA where risk type (i.e. 
financial or business) was a within-subjects factor and budget constraints was a between-
subjects factor.  Experience was included as a covariate. The results of the ANCOVA 
test are shown in Table 3.  Hypothesis H2 states that budget constraints do not affect risk 
                                                 
18 Results of this test are not tabulated. 
19 The ANCOVA analysis shown in Table 3 also supports H2 showing that senior auditors are generally 
better at identifying financial risks.  The model shows that risk type performs differently in the model 
between financial and business risks as a within-subjects factor.  This coupled with the descriptive 
statistics and the formal Z-test of population proportions indicates differences in the ability of auditors to 
identify these two different types of risks. 
20 The total risks identified for financial risks were scaled by the total possible as listed by the partner 
experts in order to produce a ratio of correct responses (i.e. if there were 2 correct of the 6 possible, the 
scaled score was .334).  This same process was done for the business risks to produce the scaled scores.  
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identification accuracy.  Based on the analysis, I cannot reject hypothesis H2; the budget 
constraint variable is not significant in the model. 
This finding indicates that identification of risks is a task limited by factors other 
than budget constraints.  I conclude that audit risks are identified regardless of the time 
budget allocations, because a failure to identify risks has serious implications and can 
lead to an ineffective audit.  The importance of risk identification is understood by 
auditors in a litigious, post-Enron environment.   Knowing that audits are under 
increased scrutiny and that audit standards primarily address financial risks, auditors are 
much more likely to focus on the identification of financial risks.  My findings suggest 
that constraints such as budgeted hours do not affect risk identification.  Instead, it 
appears that risk identification is limited primarily by auditor ability.   
Experiment Two 
In Experiment Two, I addressed risk assessment for both business and financial 
risks.  I hypothesize that goals, in the form of budget constraints, and decision aid use 
will affect the accuracy of the risk assessments.  Specifically, I predict that when 
auditors have the requisite ability, more stringent budget constraints actually improve 
auditor performance for business risks.  To test for this, I performed an ANOVA for my 
difference measures of both financial and business risk assessment. 21
                                                 
21 As discussed in the method section, accuracy measures are calculated using relative, absolute, and 
squared differences. 
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Table 3. 
Test of Budget Constraints and Experience as Predictors of Accuracy when 
Compared to Partner-Experts 
 
 
Panel A:  Multivariate Tests using Pillai’s Trace22
 
Variable Value DF F P 
Risk Type .179 1 9.844 .003 
Risk Type * Budget Constraint .000 1 0.009 .924 
Risk Type * Experience .031 1 1.444 .236 
 
Panel B:  Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts   
Variable DF F P 
Risk Type 1 9.844 .003 
Risk Type * Budget Constraint 1 0.009 .924 
Risk Type * Experience 1 1.444 .236 
Error(risk) 45    
 
Panel C:  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Variable DF F P 
Intercept 1 36.796 0.000 
Budget Constraint 1 0.007 0.935 
Experience 1 2.093 0.155 
Error 45    
 
Table 3 Variables defined: 
Risk Type is a repeated measure for each auditor.  The first measure is the proportion of 
business risks identified by the participant that agree to the partner experts and the 
second measure is the proportion of financial risks identified by the auditor participant 
that agree to the partner experts. 
Budget constraint is a binary response variable coded as 1 if the auditor was in the 450 
hour treatment and coded 0 if in the 600 hour treatment. 
Experience is a continuous variable measuring months of experience for the auditor. 
                                                 
22 Results are robust to additional measures including Wilkes’ Lamda, Hotelling’s Trace, and Roy’s 
Largest Root. 
 44
Financial Risks 
Cell means and ANOVA results for financial risks are shown in Table 4.  Cell 
means show differences from expert assessments in relative, absolute, and squared 
values in Panel A.  Relative differences related to the financial assessments show that 
audit seniors are assessing financial risks consistently higher than the partner experts.  
This indicates the seniors tend to be conservative in their assessments and would rather 
over-audit a risk than under-audit.  Cell means also show that differences appear to be 
smaller overall when a decision aid is used.  Budget constraints appear to make no 
difference when analyzing the treatment means.   
In order to formally test differences in the means, Panel B presents the ANOVA 
results.  The ANOVA for financial risks indicates that there are no differences in risk 
assessments across treatments at a standard significance level of .05.  The results of this 
test indicate that financial risk assessment is not improved by budget constraints or by 
decision aid use.  Therefore, I conclude that hypothesis H3a, stating that more stringent 
budget constraints increase the accuracy of financial risk assessments, is not supported. 
These results imply that audit seniors are conservative in their assessment of 
financial risks compared to partner experts.  This suggests that without supervision of 
more experienced auditors, audit seniors will assess risk higher than necessary, 
theoretically leading to greater audit effort and possibly to expending unneeded 
resources.  If audit seniors view the financial statement risks as their main concern for 
the audit and want to ensure they have adequately assessed risk in these areas, it is 
logical that they will be overly conservative when assessing these risks.  One interesting 
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implication of these findings is that although the budget constraint did not improve 
financial risk assessments, it also did not make assessments any worse as would be 
implied by the Houston (1999) study.  I conclude financial risk assessments are not 
affected by budget constraints, however, audit seniors appear to be overly conservative 
in their assessments of these risks. 
Business Risks 
The cell means and ANOVA analysis for business risks are shown in Table 5.  
Panel A shows cells means for business risks for relative, absolute and squared 
differences from the partner expert assessments.  The relative differences indicate that 
audit seniors are consistently assessing business risks as less risky than the partner 
experts.  This is exactly the opposite result from the financial risk assessments.  Audit 
seniors are less conservative in their risk assessments for business risks than financial 
risks.  Cell means also indicate that auditors are more accurate in their business 
assessments when they use a decision aid and have a stringent budget. 
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Table 4. 
 
Effects of Decision Aid and Budget Constraints  
on the Assessment of Financial Risks 
 
Panel A: Cell Means (Std. Dev.)a
     
  Decision Aid Use  
   
Decision Aid 
 
No Decision Aid 
Treatment 
Means 
450 Hour 
Time Budget 
  5.500   (4.917) 
  8.500   (3.490) 
18.192 (12.442) 
n = 26 
  6.692   (4.671) 
  9.308   (2.635) 
22.539 (10.428) 
n = 26 
  6.096   (4.787) 
  8.904   (3.089) 
20.365 (11.576) 
n = 52 Budget 
Constraint 
600 Hour 
Time Budget 
  4.905 (5.069) 
  8.333 (2.244) 
18.800 (8.641) 
n = 21 
  6.850   (5.932) 
  9.450   (3.410) 
23.550 (13.201) 
n = 20 
  5.854   (5.525) 
  8.878   (2.891) 
21.122 (11.219) 
n = 41 
Treatment Means 
  5.234   (4.940) 
  8.426   (2.969) 
18.468(10.802) 
n = 47 
  6.761   (5.195) 
  9.370   (2.962) 
22.978 (11.586) 
n = 46 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA of Risk Assessment Accuracy for Financial Risks 
     
   F-Value (p)b
 
DF 
Relative 
Difference
Absolute 
Difference 
Squared 
Difference
Intercept 1 123.369 (.000) 807.733 (.000) 309.004 (.000)
Budget Constraint 1 .042 (.838) .000 (.985) .119 (.731)
Decision Aid Use 1 2.152 (.146) 2.361 (.128) 3.695 (.058)
Interaction 1 .124 (.726) .061 (.806) .007 (.934)
 
a Cell means are differences from expert assessment.  Reported in order are relative, 
absolute, and squared differences.  
b Two-tailed p-values reported. 
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Formal tests of the treatments were analyzed in the ANOVA shown in Panel B.  
The interaction of decision aid use with budget constraints is significant, supporting the 
conclusions drawn from the cell means.  In order to better understand the findings of the 
interaction and to compare the effects of the four treatment combinations, contrast 
analysis was performed.  This is shown in Panel C.  I contrast the stringent budget 
constraints and decision aid treatment (µ450/DA) with the remaining three treatments 
(µ450/no DA, µ600/DA, µ600/no DA ), assigning weights of 3, -1,-1,and -1 
respectively.  My results indicate significance at .073, .012, and .033 respectively for 
relative, absolute, and squared differences.  I find that the treatment implementing both 
the more stringent budget constraint and the decision aid is performing significantly 
better than the mean of the other three treatments.  Hypothesis H3b states that decision 
aid use combined with a more stringent budget increases the accuracy of business risk 
assessments.  The contrast of budget constraints with the decision aid supports 
Hypothesis H3b. 
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Table 5. 
Effects of Decision Aid and Budget Constraints  
on the Assessment of Business Risks 
 
Panel A: Cell Means (Std. Dev.)a
  Decision Aid Use  
   
Decision Aid 
 
No Decision Aid 
Treatment 
Means 
450 Hour 
Time Budget 
 -1.960 (3.813) 
  6.360 (2.325) 
12.920 (7.989) 
n = 25 
 -3.667   (5.211) 
  7.512   (3.081) 
16.852 (10.985) 
n = 27 
 -2.846 (4.629) 
  6.962 (2.780) 
14.962 (9.772) 
n = 52 Budget 
Constraint 
600 Hour 
Time Budget 
 -5.667 (5.003) 
  8.714 (2.194) 
21.000 (8.689) 
n = 21 
 -2.857   (5.721) 
  7.238   (2.468) 
15.429 (10.028) 
n = 21 
 -4.262 (5.495) 
  7.976 (2.424) 
18.214 (9.687) 
n = 42 
Treatment Means 
 -3.652 (4.729) 
  7.435 (2.536) 
16.609 (9.174) 
n = 46 
 -3.313   (5.396) 
  7.396   (2.804) 
16.229 (10.491) 
n = 48 
 
Panel B: ANOVA of Risk Assessment Accuracy for Business Risks 
     
   F-Value (p)b
  
DF 
Relative 
Difference
Absolute 
Difference 
Squared 
Difference
Intercept 1 47.329 (.000) 781.863 (.000) 279.535 (.000)
Budget Constraint 1 1.984 (.162) 3.779 (.055) 2.826 (.096)
Decision Aid Use 1 .287 (.593) .089 (.767) .171 (.680)
Interaction 1 4.821 (.031) 6.099 (.015) 5.761 (.018)
 
Panel C: Planned Contrastc
  t-value (p) c
  
df
Relative 
Difference
Absolute 
Difference 
Squared 
Difference
µ450/DA < (µ450/no DA+µ600/DA+µ600/no DA)/3 90 1.815 (.073) -2.435 (.012) -2.169 (.033)
 
a Cell means are differences from expert assessment.  Reported in order are relative, absolute, and squared 
differences. 
b Two-tailed p-values reported. 
c Contrast weights are 3, -1,-1,-1. 
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Goal vs. Adaptive Strategy 
Both the motivational aspects of goals and the use of adaptive strategies related 
to time pressure can lead to improved performance.  It is an open question which of 
these two routes actually leads to improved risk assessments for auditors.  The ANOVA 
and contrast analysis shown in Table 5 indicate that there is improvement in 
performance related to stringent budget constraints and use of a decision aid.  Since 
Hypothesis H3b is supported, it is now appropriate to test Hypothesis H4b in order to 
understand how this interaction is cognitively motivating the auditors.23
Hypothesis H4b states that when auditors use a decision aid, stringent time 
constraints improve business risk assessments in two ways: (a) directly through a goal 
effect, and (b) indirectly through perceived budget pressure.  I test this hypothesis 
through path analysis.  To analyze the interaction with the decision aid, the data is split 
on the decision aid variable.  Figure 4 panel A shows the path analysis for auditors using 
the decision aid, and panel B shows the path analysis for auditors not using the decision 
aid. 
As shown in the path model, more stringent budget constraints increased the 
accuracy of business risk assessment (decreased the difference measure).  However, 
more stringent budget constraints had no effect on perceived budget pressure.  These 
results indicate that goal-induced motivation from stringent budget constraints is 
improving auditor performance related to business risk assessments.  While budget 
                                                 
23 Results are also shown for hypothesis H4a in Figure 4.  Hypothesis H4a states that stringent time 
constraints improve financial risk assessments in two ways: (a) directly through a goal effect and (b) 
indirectly through perceived budget pressure, and is dependent upon supporting Hypothesis H3a.  
Hypothesis H3a was not supported. 
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constraints do not have the expected effect of increasing budget pressure, increases in 
perceived budget pressure resulted in improved business risk assessments as predicted.  
This indicates that auditors did use a beneficial, adaptive strategy to perceived budget 
pressure.   Overall, budget constraints enhanced performance via a goal induced 
motivation route, but not via budget pressure route; therefore, I find partial support for 
Hypothesis H4b. 
Figure 4 panel B shows the path analysis for auditors that did not use a decision 
aid.  These auditors did not have a tool to aid ability; therefore, I expect that goals cannot 
motivate these individuals.  Additionally, I expect that these auditors cannot respond to 
perceived budget pressure in an adaptive manner.  Without use of a decision aid to proxy 
for ability, the more stringent budget constraint increased perceived budget pressure, but 
had no effect on the difference measures.  The increase in perceived budget pressure also 
had no effect on the business risk assessment difference measure.   
An interesting difference in the two path models in Figure 4 are the paths from 
the Budget Constraint variable to the Perceived Budget Pressure variable.  When the 
auditor used a decision aid, more stringent budget constraints did not increase perceived 
budget pressure.  Without the use of a decision aid, more stringent budget constraints did 
increase perceived budget pressure.  This suggests that the structuring decision aid can 
alleviate perceived pressures associated with more stringent budget constraints.   
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Figure 4. 
 
Path Analysis Models of Routes to Improved Risk Assessments  
 
Panel A:  Risk Assessment with Decision Aid 
 Perceived Need for 
Additional Time 
Experience 
(months) 
* p < .01 
All coefficients are shown standardized.  Results are shown for absolute differences. 
-.025 Budget goal Perceived Budget 
Pressure 
Adj. R2 = .168 
Difference Measure of 
Financial Risk 
Assessment 
Adj. R2 = -.033 
Difference Measure of 
Business Risk 
Assessment 
Adj. R2 = .365 
-.002
.476*
.030 
-.112
-.396*
-.474* 
Panel B:  Risk Assessment without Decision Aid 
 Perceived Need for 
Additional Time 
Experience 
(months) 
.347*Budget goal 
Perceived Budget 
Pressure 
Adj. R2 = .459 
Difference Measure of 
Financial Risk 
Assessment 
Adj. R2 = -.030 
Difference Measure of 
Business Risk 
Assessment 
Adj. R2 = -.002
.482* -.078
.060 
-.148
-.236
.154 
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Overall, the results of the path analysis support the theory that auditor ability is 
essential to implementing any methods that improve auditor business risk assessments.  
Auditors in the treatments without decision aids felt increased pressure, but were unable 
to use this to improve risk assessments because they did not have the ability.  On the 
other hand, auditors with use of a decision aid to enhance their ability were able to show 
improved business risk assessments.   
Summary 
 The results of Experiment One support the proposition that auditors are better at 
identifying financial risks than business risks.  Results also indicate that budget 
constraints do not affect risk identification for either financial or business risks.  This is 
likely due to the importance of risk identification.  Auditors are expected to identify 
relevant risks; therefore they do so regardless of budget constraints.   
Results of Experiment Two partially support my hypotheses suggesting that 
ability allows auditors to be positively affected by budget constraints during risk 
assessment.  More stringent budget constraints did not affect financial risk assessments.  
This is most likely due to auditor responsibility related to the financial audit.  
Conversely, business risk assessments became more accurate when auditors were 
provided with a decision aid and given more stringent budget constraints. When 
improvements in business risk assessments were realized, I find that budget constraints 
improve performance via a goal route.  While I also find that perceived budget pressure 
improves business risk assessments, it is unrelated to the manipulated budget constraints.  
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Perceived budget pressure influences performance independent of the budget constraint 
goal.   
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This research investigates risk analysis within a risk based audit environment. 
Risk based audit approaches have become increasingly popular in recent years.  These 
approaches support the idea that if auditors understand the client business, they are better 
able to identify potential audit risk areas, and perform more effective, and possibly more 
efficient, audits.  This study employs two experiments to investigate both risk 
identification and risk assessment within a RBA environment.     
There are three key findings from this research study.  First, I find that audit 
seniors are better able to identify financial risks compared to business risks, suggesting 
there are differences in schematic knowledge related to these two risk types.  Results 
also indicate that budget constraints do not improve risk identification.  This result was 
expected but previously untested.  Risk identification has received little attention in the 
literature, and my study adds to this research stream.  Finally, I find that with decision 
aid use, budget constraints improve performance on a business risk assessment task.  
This last finding provides insight into ways in which firms can improve business risk 
assessments and also gives insight into the motivational effects of budget constraints. 
Limitations 
As with any experimental research, I offer internal validity at a sacrifice to some 
external validity issues.  Audit planning materials are rich; however, they were restricted 
in this study in order to keep the experiment within an acceptable time frame.  Total time 
allowed for this experiment was not allowed to exceed one hour, therefore the materials 
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presented were limited.  The materials were reviewed by partners at the participating 
audit firm and were considered to be realistic.  Some audit firms provide templates and 
procedures that are adapted to specific industries to assist auditors in their risk 
identification and assessment tasks.  The use of such materials may improve auditor 
ability to identify risks, although this question is left to future research and is not 
answered in the current study.    
All of the experimental participants were audit seniors from one Big Four 
accounting firm.  The results of this study, therefore, cannot be generalized to other 
experience levels.  Although other firms use RBA approaches, I cannot determine 
whether these results are applicable to other firms.  Auditing usually involves an audit 
team made up of individuals with varied experience levels.  In this experiment I use 
individual judgments that do not capture dynamic team interactions.  While this is a 
limitation, it is consistent with prior research in judgment and decision-making in 
auditing.  Addressing risk identification in a team setting may prove a fruitful area for 
future research.  Finally, this study addresses risk identification only during the planning 
stage of the audit.  As the audit progresses, additional risk areas are likely to be 
identified, changing the audit procedures and, ultimately, the time spent on the audit.  
Future research could look at how much auditors rely on the initial risk identification 
and assessment process and how newly identified risks are integrated into the audit plan. 
Future Research 
There continues to be little research in auditing on the identification of audit 
risks.  Given the importance of this task to the overall audit, additional studies should be 
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done in this area.  Specifically, work dealing with industry specialization effects on risk 
identification may prove to be an interesting area for study.  Also, many audit firms have 
software to provide assistance in identifying risks and documenting RBA procedures.  
Future research should look at how auditors use this software to more effectively address 
audit risks and if reliance on this software has any negative effects on the audit. 
Risk based auditing provides additional avenues for research as well.  
Implementing these audits and including work to address business risks entails different 
types of procedures to verify assumptions.  Traditional audit procedures such as 
vouching or sending confirmations will not be useful for assessing strategic business 
risks.  Investigating new audit procedures and documentation of evidence may also 
prove to be an interesting study.  
The planning fallacy is the inability of a person to estimate the time to complete a 
task (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  (E.g. A person estimates that writing a report will 
take two hours, but it actually takes four.)  I am not aware of any audit studies that 
address how often auditor-created budgets are actually inaccurate due to the planning 
fallacy.  The extant literature investigates auditor reaction to budget limits; however 
there are no studies that investigate if the budgets are attainable or if the budgets are 
accurate.  Future research should investigate the accuracy of auditor time budgets 
because this has implications for audit planning, client billing, and auditor job stress. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 There has been conjecture in the business and academic press that auditors have 
limited ability to identify risks in a RBA environment (Cullinan and Sutton 2002; Weil 
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2004).  In addition, risk identification processes have had little attention in the auditing 
literature (Bedard and Graham 2002).  This study uses an experiment to investigate 
auditor risk identification in a RBA environment.  I find that auditors are better able to 
identify audit risks that are financial in nature, than those that represent strategic 
business risks.  This finding is important because it provides evidence supporting claims 
that auditors may not be very good at identifying risks (Cullinan and Sutton 2002; Weil 
2004).     
 I also test whether budget constraints improve risk identification.  As expected, I 
find that budget constraints have no effect.  I expected this result because auditors 
recognize the importance of risk identification to the audit.  They realize that not 
identifying risks can lead to audit failures.  Therefore, the identification of risks is not 
affected by an external factor such as budget constraints.  Risk identification appears to 
be limited by auditor ability. 
 In a separate analysis, I address the effects of budget constraints on risk 
assessment.  I find that financial risk assessments are not affected by budget constraints 
as auditors already have a high level of schematic knowledge related to these risks.  
Conversely, I find that when a decision aid is used, a stringent budget constraint induces 
improved business risk assessments.  Additionally, I find that business risk assessments 
are improved via both of the theoretical routes discussed in this paper when a decision 
aid is provided.  Auditors with improved ability have better risk assessments when they 
have a more difficult goal in the form of a budget constraint.  Also, performance 
improved as these auditors perceived increased budget pressure, indicating that they 
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made use of an adaptive time pressure strategy.  This implies that instituting moderate 
budget pressure on engagements can improve auditor performance when the auditors 
have the requisite ability. 
 This study contributes to the accounting literature in several ways.  First, it 
informs the audit literature regarding budget constraints and decision aid use as a way to 
improve risk assessments related to business risks.  Prior research in auditing has found 
that risk assessments are improved when made by industry specialist auditors (Low 
2004).  This study suggests that when industry specialists are not available, assessments 
can be improved through use of a non-deterministic decision aid. 
 The current study also has implications for practice.  First, I find that the ability 
of audit seniors to identify business risks is limited.  This has serious implications for 
firms using a RBA approach.  Firms that use RBA methods should consider ways to 
improve business risk identification such as providing additional training, including 
industry risk experts on engagement teams, and ensuring up-front involvement of 
experienced personnel during audit planning.  Additionally, there is anecdotal evidence 
that audit managers and partners use budgets as a motivational tool for audit staff.  I find 
that more stringent budget constraints can provide motivation, assuming that personnel 
have ability to act on these goals.   
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Script 
 
You have been requested to assist with an experiment about risk identification and 
assessment.  In a few minutes you will each receive an envelope.  Inside the envelope 
are several stapled packets of paper.  Please read the page marked “Read this Page first.” 
 
Next, you will complete the demographic questions and read an introduction to the case.   
 
When that is done, you will use the packet marked company information to help you to 
complete the items in the Risk Template.  Please complete the Risk Template and using 
the Company Information provided. 
 
After you have completed the risk template, please fill out the short debriefing 
questionnaire.  You will have about one hour to complete these materials. 
 
Please note that your package may be different than your fellow participants’.  It is 
important that you not discuss or compare information as your tasks may be different. 
 
Thank you for your participation in this research. 
 
At this time I will distribute the envelopes. 
 
 
(At 11:55)  At this time you have only a few minutes remaining.  Please complete what 
you are working on and put the materials back in the envelope.   
 
(At 11:58)  At this time, please pass your envelopes to the front of the room with all 
materials in them and I will collect them. 
 
Again, I thank you for your participation. 
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General Instructions 
 
1. This study will provide insights about how auditors identify audit risks.   
2. This envelope contains several parts.   
• Information Sheet 
• Administrative Materials & Demographics (this booklet) 
• Company Information 
• Risk Template 
• Debriefing Questionnaire.  
3. Complete this booklet after you have read these instructions. 
4. Review the Company Information and Risk Template next so that you can 
determine the most efficient way to complete the research task within the allotted 
time. 
5. Complete the Debriefing Questionnaire last. 
6. Additional instructions will appear as necessary throughout the booklets. 
7. Please do not communicate with the other participants while you are completing 
this study.  Different participants have different tasks. 
8. You will have one hour to complete this study.  Please monitor the time to try to 
complete the whole study within the hour. 
 
 
 
I thank you for agreeing to participate in this study! 
 
Michelle Chandler Diaz 
Doctoral Student 
Mays Business School 
Texas A&M University   
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Demographic Information 
 
1. How many months of audit experience do you have?   
 
_____ months 
 
2. What is your current job title?   
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
3. How many months have you held this title? 
 
_____ months 
 
4. In what industries (or business groups) have you currently or previously been 
designated by your firm as an audit specialist? 
 
Time Industry Number of Months 
Current   
Previous   
Previous   
 
5. Since you began at the firm, what percentage of time have you spent performing 
audits of manufacturing companies?   
 
______% of my time has been spent auditing manufacturing companies. 
 
6. Have you ever audited a company that manufactured equipment used to analyze 
air and water samples? 
    
Yes  No 
 
7. If you answered yes to question six, how much time in months have you spent 
working on this client? 
    
____ months 
 
8. Do you have any experience other than audit experience that includes work with 
a company that manufactured equipment used to analyze air and water samples?  
  
 
Yes  No 
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9. Please indicate the percent of your clients that fall in the following categories for 
annual audit hours.  Please estimate to the best of your ability if you are unsure. 
   
Annual Audit Hours Percent 
500 or less  
501-800  
801-1100  
1101-1400  
More than 1400  
Total 100% 
 
10. Choose the answer that is representative of most of the clients on which you 
work.  The initial budget that is set for my audits by the partner or manager is 
a. Very inadequate to complete the work. 
b. Not quite adequate to complete the work. 
c. Adequate to complete the work if everything goes well. 
d. Adequate to complete the work comfortably. 
e. More than adequate.  I rarely have trouble meeting the initial budget. 
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 Research Task 
 
You have recently been informed that your office has accepted a new client, 
Chemical Analysis Products Inc. (CAP) and you will be the in-charge on this 
engagement.  This company manufactures analyzer machines that test for impurities 
and other chemicals in air and water samples.   
 
The manager on the engagement has asked you to review some information about the 
industry and the client and provide her with an initial list of audit risk areas.  You 
can find information about the client, including the prior year financial statements in 
Company Information.   
 
For each audit risk area, she has also requested that you provide a rough estimate of 
the total hours you expect to spend to audit that area.  She has told you that it is 
important to watch the budget on this relatively small client and that she wants you 
to work from an initial budget of 450 hours.  In her discussions with the previous 
auditors, she learned that they typically spent about 500 hours on the audit.  She 
has provided you with a template for listing these risks with the related hours (See 
Risk Template). 
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Research Task 
 
You have recently been informed that your office has accepted a new client, 
Chemical Analysis Products Inc. (CAP) and you will be the in-charge on this 
engagement.  This company manufactures analyzer machines that test for impurities 
and other chemicals in air and water samples.   
 
The manager on the engagement has asked you to review some information about the 
industry and the client and provide her with an initial list of audit risk areas.  You 
can find information about the client, including the prior year financial statements in 
Company Information.   
 
For each audit risk area, she has also requested that you provide a rough estimate of 
the total hours you expect to spend to audit that area.  She has told you that it is 
important to watch the budget on this relatively small client and that she wants you 
to work from an initial budget of 600 hours.  In her discussions with the previous 
auditors, she learned that they typically spent about 500 hours on the audit.  She 
has provided you with a template for listing these risks with the related hours (See 
Risk Template). 
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Company Information 
 
General 
 
Chemical Analysis Products, Inc. (the “Company” or CAP) is a corporation that was 
organized in 1974, in the State of Texas.  CAP is located in College Station, Texas.   
 
CAP designs, manufactures, markets, and services products primarily for specialized 
applications in the analytical instruments markets. CAP’s principal business strategy is 
to direct its product development capabilities, manufacturing processes, and marketing 
skills toward market niches that it believes it can successfully penetrate and quickly 
assume a leading position. Management continually emphasizes product innovation, 
improvement in quality and product performance, on-time delivery, cost reductions, and 
other value-added activities. CAP seeks growth opportunities through technological and 
product improvement, the development of new applications for existing products, and by 
the acquisition and development of new products, new markets, and new competencies. 
 
 
Products 
 
CAP develops, manufactures, markets, and services analytical, monitoring, and sample 
preparation products, components, and systems used to detect, measure, and analyze 
chemical compounds. Such products include: 
 
Gas Chromatography Instruments and Systems CAP designs, manufactures, markets, 
and services components for gas chromatographs. Gas chromatographs can analyze 
chemical compounds in gas, liquids, or solids matrices using the appropriate 
components. 
 
Total Organic Carbon Analyzer Systems CAP designs, manufactures, markets, and 
services Total Organic Carbon analyzers and related accessories that are used to measure 
organic and inorganic carbon levels in water, soils, and solids used in U.S. 
pharmaceutical methods, the manufacturing of semiconductors, power generation, and 
oceanographic research.  
 
Ion Analysis Systems CAP designs, manufactures, markets, and services ion analysis 
flow systems. These instruments perform a wide range of ion analyses, including the 
measurement of nitrate, nitrite, phosphate, ammonia, chloride, alkalinity, and sulfate in 
liquids.  
 
Sample Preparation Products and Systems CAP designs, manufactures, markets, and 
services sample preparation instrumentation used to prepare sample matrices for 
analysis. The most time-consuming part of chemical analysis is sample preparation. 
Procedures, techniques, and instruments that can reduce total sample preparation time 
are highly desirable for the analysis of chemical compounds.  
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Beverage Analyzers During 2004, the first sale of the BEV 2100 was made.  This is an 
online beverage monitor that measures sugar, diet and carbon dioxide levels in beverage 
process streams.  Major domestic soft drink producers have established preferred vendor 
programs, and CAP’s ability to become a qualified supplier to the major domestic soft 
drink producers will affect their ability to penetrate this market. 
 
Manufacturing 
 
CAP manufactures products by using similar techniques and methods at two locations in 
the U.S.  CAP’s products have been certified pursuant to safety standards by 
Underwriters Laboratories (UL) that certify that instruments meet certain performance 
standards and that advertised specifications are accurate. In 1999, CAP obtained ISO 
9001 certification at both of its manufacturing operations. 
 
Technical Support 
 
CAP employs a technical support staff that provides on-site installation, service, and 
after-sale support of its products in an attempt to ensure customer satisfaction. Technical 
support services are included in the initial sale of certain products and, if not included in 
the initial purchase, may be purchased later by customers. CAP offers training courses 
and publishes technical bulletins containing product repair information, parts lists, and 
application support information for customers. CAP installs and services its products 
through its field service personnel and through third-party contractors. 
 
Research and Development 
 
The analytical instrumentation industry is subject to rapid changes in technology. The  
Company’s success is heavily dependent on its ability to continually improve its existing 
products, advance technologies, increase product reliability and performance, and 
improve data handling.  CAP actively pursues development of potential new products, 
thereby incurring significant R&D costs each year.  During the third quarter of 2003, 
CAP announced its commitment to increase spending on R&D of potential new 
products, and spending on R&D was up 20% from the prior year.  Although spending 
will fluctuate from period to period, overall spending on R&D is expected to increase in 
2004. 
 
Some markets that CAP services are experiencing slow growth and declining revenues.  
CAP cannot maintain the market position of every product without incurring 
development expense that is higher than the industry average of 7-9% of sales.  In those 
segments, current investment levels are being evaluated and may be discontinued by 
December 2004. 
 
CAP encounters aggressive competition in all aspects of its business activity. CAP 
competes with many firms in the design, manufacture, and sale of analytical instruments, 
principally on the basis of product technology and performance, product quality and 
reliability, sales and marketing capability, access to channels of distribution and product 
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support, and delivery and price. Most of CAP’s competitors have significantly greater 
resources than CAP in virtually all aspects of competition, including financial and 
related resources, market coverage on a global basis, breadth of product(s) in each 
market segment(s) served, access to human and technical resources, buying power, and 
marketing strength, including brand recognition and market share. 
 
Patents 
 
CAP holds both U.S. and international patents. CAP currently holds 25 patents as of 
year-end 2003, which expire between the years 2004 and 2020, compared to the 19 
patents it held in the prior year. CAP seeks patent coverage on technology developments 
that it regards as material and patentable. While CAP believes that all of its patents and 
applications have value, its future success is not dependent on any single patent or 
application. 
 
Market Trends 
 
The environmental testing market has been and continues to be an important market for 
CAP’s current product market position.  Customers in this market include municipal, 
state, and federal governments; industrial and engineering firms; commercial testing 
laboratories and academic institutions.  Market demand for environmental testing is 
determined primarily by federal legislation, and funding for enforcement of this 
legislation. Increased concerns about protecting the nation’s water supply will require 
more emphasis on testing to ensure water quality in the public waterways, lakes, and 
drinking water.   
 
CAP’s customers include various military agencies of the U.S. government, industrial 
businesses, semiconductor manufacturers, engineering and consulting firms, 
municipalities, environmental testing laboratories, and beverage bottlers. No single 
customer accounted for more than 10% of revenues in 2003. One customer accounted 
for approximately 10% of revenues in 2002. Federal, state, and municipal governments 
and public and private research institutions in the aggregate accounted for 20% of 
revenues in 2003 and 17% of revenues in 2002. Export sales accounted for 27% of 
revenues in 2003, compared to 25% of revenues in 2002. 
 
In recent years, the U.S. environmental laboratory testing industry has declined, leading 
to significant consolidation in this market.  Internationally, however, some countries are 
just beginning to develop environmental policies.  CAP intends to invest effort in 
developing strong relationships with representatives in key developing markets. 
 
CAP markets and sells analytical components and systems that it manufactures and that 
it purchases for resale, provides on-site installation and support services, and distributes 
expendables and accessories required to support the operation of products sold. CAP 
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sells its products domestically to end users through a direct sales channel, 
manufacturers’ representatives, distributors, and resellers, and internationally through 
independent manufacturers’ representatives and distributors.  
Company Officers 
 
John R. Smith joined CAP as President and Chief Operating Officer on July 7, 1985, 
named Chief Executive Officer of CAP on July 19, 1986, and appointed Chairman of the 
Board of Directors of CAP on May 26, 1990. Prior to joining CAP, he was Executive 
 
Vice President and General Manager of the Howell Division of SMA Inc.; Division 
Managing Engineer of Chem-all, Inc.; Assistant Plant and Engineering Manager, Bell 
Industries. 
 
Rita B. Hayes has been employed with CAP since 1981. She was named Corporate 
Secretary and Executive Vice President in 1989. 
 
Jack M. Fox joined CAP as Corporate Controller on June 30, 2001. Prior to joining 
CAP, he was an Audit Manager for Ernst & Young LLP in New Orleans, Louisiana. He 
received his Certified Public Accountant certification in 1998. On June 17, 2002, he was 
named Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer. 
 
Environmental Regulations 
 
CAP believes it is in compliance with federal, state, and local laws and regulations 
involving the protection of the environment. CAP routinely handles small amounts of 
materials that might be deemed hazardous. Hazardous materials are primarily introduced 
into CAP’s products by end-users rather than by CAP. CAP believes there will be no 
material effect upon its capital expenditures, earnings, and competitive position caused 
by its compliance with federal, state, or local provisions regulating the discharge of 
materials into the environment or relating to the protection of the environment. 
However, to the extent that analytical instruments designed and manufactured by CAP 
for environmental analysis are purchased by its customers to assist them in complying 
with environmental regulations, changes to these regulations could reduce demand for 
some of CAP’s products. 
 
Suppliers 
 
CAP produces its products from raw materials, component parts, and other supplies that 
are generally available from a number of different sources. CAP has few long-term 
contracts with suppliers. For certain purchased materials, CAP has developed preferred 
sources on the basis of quality and service. Several purchased components are supplied 
by single-source suppliers.  
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Recent Developments 
 
To better position CAP with the technology needed to provide leading-edge products for 
use in homeland defense, security, and other markets, CAP entered a strategic alliance 
with Lexus Products Co. (“Lexus”). The alliance includes a commercial agreement and 
investment of $1,000,000 in a Series A Preferred Share offering by Lexus. Upon 
conversion, CAP’s investment will represent, on a fully diluted basis, approximately 
15% ownership in Lexus common shares. Under the Commercial Agreement, CAP will 
provide up to $1,350,000 for the completion by Lexus of certain product developments 
according to agreed- upon milestones and is entitled to certain intellectual property 
controlled by Lexus.  
 
During the quarter ended September 30, 2002, CAP completed an evaluation of the 
future prospects of certain products and determined to discontinue manufacturing, sales, 
service, and support for certain sample preparation, gas chromatography, and ion 
analyzer products. CAP came to these decisions because purchase components are no 
longer available for support of those products and sales volumes for those products no 
longer represent a viable business opportunity for CAP.  
 
CAP began to repurchase shares of CAP’s common stock under the stock repurchase 
program during 2003, reducing the shares outstanding to 2,748,625 as of December 31, 
2003.  CAP expects to continue to repurchase stock throughout 2004. 
Accounting Policies Information 
 
Revenue Recognition CAP derives revenues from three sources: system sales, part 
sales, and services. For system sales and parts sales, revenue is generally recognized 
when persuasive evidence of an arrangement exists, delivery has occurred, the contract 
price is fixed or determinable, title and risk of loss has passed to the customer, and 
collection is reasonably assured. CAP’s sales are typically not subject to rights of return.  
Historically, sales returns have not been significant. For certain system sales that involve 
unique customer acceptance terms or new specifications or technology with customer 
acceptance provisions, all revenue is generally deferred until customer acceptance. 
Revenue related to part sales is recognized when the parts have been shipped and title 
and risk of loss have passed to the customer. Deferred revenue is included in accrued 
liabilities in the balance sheet. 
 
Accounts Receivable CAP maintains allowances for doubtful accounts for estimated 
losses resulting from the failure of its customers to make required payments and for 
estimated sales returns. Customers may not make payments or may return products due 
to a variety of reasons including deterioration of their financial condition or 
dissatisfaction with CAP’s products. Management makes regular assessments of 
doubtful accounts and uses the best information available including correspondence with 
customers and credit reports.  
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Inventories Inventories consist of electronic equipment and various components. CAP 
operates in an industry where technological advances or new product introductions are a 
frequent occurrence.  CAP had changes in required reserves in recent periods due to 
discontinuation of certain product lines and obsolescence related to new product 
introductions, as well as declining market conditions.  
 
Intangible Assets CAP’s intangible assets primarily include product patents, trade 
names and trademarks. CAP adopted Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
(SFAS) No. 142, on January 1, 2002, as required. Accordingly, CAP annually reviews 
the recoverability and estimated useful lives of other intangible assets for impairment. 
During the quarter ended June 30, 2004, CAP completed an evaluation of the future 
prospects of certain products and determined to discontinue manufacturing, sales, 
service, and support for certain sample preparation, gas chromatography, and ion 
analyzer products. CAP came to these decisions because purchase components are no 
longer available for support of those products and sales volume for those products no 
longer represent a viable business opportunity for CAP.  
 
Product Warranties Products generally carry one year of warranty. Once the warranty 
period has expired, the customer may purchase an extended product warranty typically 
covering an additional period of one year. Extended warranty billings are generally 
invoiced to the customer at the beginning of the contract term.  
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Outlook, 13(1): 5.  2004 by Strategic Directions International, Inc. 
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Instructions 
 
 
1. Make a list of audit risks in the template that follows.  Name each risk and 
provide a brief description if the name is not explanatory. 
2. For each risk, use your judgment to determine if this audit risk is High, Medium, 
or Low and circle your evaluation in the appropriate column. 
3. Assign an estimate of hours you expect to spend auditing each risk area that you 
list.   
4. Sum the hours for the risks listed on each page and write in the space provided. 
5. Make sure that the total of your hours is equal to 600 hours by completing the 
Reconciliation of Hours in the Risk Template.   
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Instructions 
 
 
1.  Make a list of audit risks in the template that follows.  Name each risk and 
provide a brief description if the name is not explanatory. 
2. For each risk, use your judgment to determine if this audit risk is High, Medium, 
or Low and circle your evaluation in the appropriate column. 
3. Assign an estimate of hours you expect to spend auditing each risk area that you 
list.   
4. Sum the hours for the risks listed on each page and write in the space provided. 
5. Make sure that the total of your hours is equal to 450 hours by completing the 
Reconciliation of Hours in the Risk Template
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Risk 1 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
 
Risk 2 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
 
 
Risk 3 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
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Risk 4 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 4 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
 
Risk 5 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 5 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
 
 
Risk 6 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
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Risk 7 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
 
Risk 8 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 8 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
 
 
Risk 9 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 9 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
 
 
 
 92
Risk 10 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 10 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
 
Risk 11 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 11 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
 
 
Risk 12 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 12 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
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Risk 13 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 13 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
 
Risk 14 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 14 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
 
 
Risk 15 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 15 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
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Risk 16 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 16 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
 
Risk 17 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 17 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
 
 
Risk 18 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 18 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
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Risk 19 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 19 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
 
Risk 20 Hours 
 
 
 
 
Level of Risk 20 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Low 
Risk 
  Moderate 
Risk 
  Very 
High 
Risk 
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(450 AND 600 HOUR TREATMENTS)
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Reconciliation of Hours in the Risk Template 
 
Instructions:  While reading the company information, use the 
following pages to list audit risks that you identify.  Estimate 
hours and assess the level of each of these risks.  Next, add the 
total hours from each risk in this table to ensure that the total 
allocated hours are equal to the total budgeted hours assigned 
by the manager  in part one of the case.  You do not need to 
list 20 risks.  Just complete as many as you deem appropriate 
to the client. 
 
Risk Template Page Estimated Hours on Page 
Risk 1  
Risk 2  
Risk 3  
Risk 4  
Risk 5  
Risk 6  
Risk 7  
Risk 8  
Risk 9  
Risk 10  
Risk 11  
Risk 12  
Risk 13  
Risk 14  
Risk 15  
Risk 16  
Risk 17  
Risk 18  
Risk 19  
Risk 20  
Total of All Risks 450 
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Reconciliation of Hours in the Risk Template 
 
Instructions:  While reading the company information, use the 
following pages to list audit risks that you identify.  Estimate 
hours and assess the level of each of these risks.  Next, add the 
total hours from each risk in this table to ensure that the total 
allocated hours are equal to the total budgeted hours assigned 
by the manager  in part one of the case.  You do not need to 
list 20 risks.  Just complete as many as you deem appropriate 
to the client. 
 
Risk Template Page Estimated Hours on Page 
Risk 1  
Risk 2  
Risk 3  
Risk 4  
Risk 5  
Risk 6  
Risk 7  
Risk 8  
Risk 9  
Risk 10  
Risk 11  
Risk 12  
Risk 13  
Risk 14  
Risk 15  
Risk 16  
Risk 17  
Risk 18  
Risk 19  
Risk 20  
Total of All Risks 600 
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APPENDIX I 
 
 
DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE
 100
Debriefing Questionnaire 
Do this Last! 
 
1. How many hours did the manager give you as an initial budget? 
 
400  450  500  550  600 
 
2. How many hours did the previous auditors take to complete this audit in the 
past? 
 
400  450  500  550  600 
 
3. How much budget pressure did you feel for this task? 
4.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very Low 
pressure 
  Moderate 
pressure 
  Very High 
Pressure 
 
5. Was there any additional information you would have liked to have for CAP?   
6.  
YES NO 
 
7. If you answered “yes” to number 4 would you have wanted any of the following 
information?  Circle all that apply. 
 
Analyst Reports  MD&A Risk Factors from Form 10K  
 
 Complete Footnotes  Other___________________ 
 
6.  Do you feel the hours assigned for this client are adequate based on the risks 
identified? 
7.  
YES  NO 
 
8. If you answered “NO” to question 4, how many additional hours would you 
need? 
 
1-50  51-100  101-150 151-200 201 or more  
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Please indicate what information was most important in helping you to complete the task 
that you just performed.  Rate each item from 1-5, where 1 is the most important, 2 is 
second most important, and 5 is the least important. 
 
Information Rating 
General Text describing CAP, Inc.  
Recent Developments about CAP, Inc.  
Accounting Policies for CAP, Inc.  
Financials for CAP, Inc.  
Excerpts from trade journal  
 
For each of the following, please rate how useful it was in completing your task in the 
preceding experiment. 
 
The general text describing CAP, Inc was 
 
Not Useful at 
all 
Somewhat 
Useful 
Useful Very Useful Extremely 
Useful 
 
The recent developments description of CAP, Inc was 
 
Not Useful at 
all 
Somewhat 
Useful 
Useful Very Useful Extremely 
Useful 
 
The text describing the accounting policies of CAP, Inc was 
 
Not Useful at 
all 
Somewhat 
Useful 
Useful Very Useful Extremely 
Useful 
 
The financial statements for CAP, Inc were 
 
Not Useful at 
all 
Somewhat 
Useful 
Useful Very Useful Extremely 
Useful 
 
The excerpts from trade journal related to CAP, Inc was 
 
Not Useful at 
all 
Somewhat 
Useful 
Useful Very Useful Extremely 
Useful 
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APPENDIX J 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT TWO  
 
DECISION AID TREATMENTS 
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General Instructions 
 
1. This study will provide insights about how auditors identify audit risks.   
2.  This envelope contains several parts.   
• Information Sheet 
• Administrative Materials & Demographics (this booklet) 
• Company Information 
• Risk Assessment Tool 
• Risk Template 
• Debriefing Questionnaire.  
3. Complete this booklet after you have read these instructions. 
4. Review the Company Information, Risk Assessment Tool and Risk Template 
next so that you can determine the most efficient way to complete the research 
task within the allotted time. 
5. Complete the Debriefing Questionnaire last. 
6. Additional instructions will appear as necessary throughout the booklets. 
7. Please do not communicate with the other participants while you are completing 
this study.  Different participants have different tasks. 
8. You will have one hour to complete this study.  Please monitor the time to try to 
complete the whole study within the hour. 
 
 
I thank you for agreeing to participate in this study! 
 
Michelle Chandler Diaz 
Doctoral Student 
Mays Business School 
Texas A&M University   
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APPENDIX K 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT TWO  
 
NO DECISION AID TREATMENTS 
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General Instructions 
 
1.  This study will provide insights about how auditors identify audit risks.   
2.  This envelope contains several parts.   
• Information Sheet 
• Administrative Materials & Demographics (this booklet) 
• Company Information 
• Risk Template 
• Debriefing Questionnaire.  
3. Complete this booklet after you have read these instructions. 
4. Review the Company Information, Risk Assessment Tool and Risk Template 
next so that you can determine the most efficient way to complete the research 
task within the allotted time. 
5. Complete the Debriefing Questionnaire last. 
6. Additional instructions will appear as necessary throughout the booklets. 
7. Please do not communicate with the other participants while you are completing 
this study.  Different participants have different tasks. 
8. You will have one hour to complete this study.  Please monitor the time to try to 
complete the whole study within the hour. 
 
 
I thank you for agreeing to participate in this study! 
 
Michelle Chandler Diaz 
Doctoral Student 
Mays Business School 
Texas A&M University   
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APPENDIX L 
 
 
EXPERIMENT TWO RESEARCH TASK 
 
(450 AND 600 HOUR TREATMENTS) 
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Research Task 
 
You have recently been informed that your office has accepted a new client, 
Chemical Analysis Products Inc. (CAP) and you will be the in-charge on this 
engagement.  This company manufactures analyzer machines that test for impurities 
and other chemicals in air and water samples.   
 
The manager on the engagement has asked you to review some information about the 
industry and the client and look over her list initial list of audit risk areas.  You can 
find information about the client, including the prior year financial statements in 
Company Information.  For each audit risk area, she has requested that you provide a 
rough estimate of the total hours you expect to spend to audit that area and an overall 
judgment about the level of that risk.   
 
She has told you that it is important to watch the budget on this relatively small 
client and that she wants you to work from an initial budget of 450 hours.  In her 
discussions with the previous auditors, she learned that they typically spent about 
500 hours on the audit.  She has provided you with a template for listing these risks 
with the related hours (See Risk Template). 
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Research Task 
 
You have recently been informed that your office has accepted a new client, 
Chemical Analysis Products Inc. (CAP) and you will be the in-charge on this 
engagement.  This company manufactures analyzer machines that test for impurities 
and other chemicals in air and water samples.   
 
The manager on the engagement has asked you to review some information about the 
industry and the client and look over her list initial list of audit risk areas.  You can 
find information about the client, including the prior year financial statements in 
Company Information.  For each audit risk area, she has requested that you provide a 
rough estimate of the total hours you expect to spend to audit that area and an overall 
judgment about the level of that risk.   
 
She has told you that it is important to watch the budget on this relatively small 
client and that she wants you to work from an initial budget of 600 hours.  In her 
discussions with the previous auditors, she learned that they typically spent about 
500 hours on the audit.  She has provided you with a template for listing these risks 
with the related hours (See Risk Template). 
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APPENDIX M 
 
 
RISK LISTING TEMPLATE FOR  
 
450 AND 600 HOUR TREATMENTS 
 
(NOTE THAT THIS ONLY REPRESENTS ONE OF THE RANDOMIZED 
ORDERS OF THE RISKS) 
 
  
Risk Template 
 
   Level of Risk (Circle your choice) 
       
Risk Name 
 
Hours 
Very 
Low 
Moder-
ate 
Very
High 
1 Inaccurate valuation of investments.         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   2 
Insufficient R&D spending resulting in declining product 
performance and acceptability.  1       2 3 4 5 6 7
3 
Inability to purchase necessary components of inventory 
from suppliers.  1       2 3 4 5 6 7
4 Compensation insufficient to retain competent personnel.         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5 The Company’s environmental policies and procedures do not adequately prevent environmental issues.         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6 Inadequate warranty reserves established for products sold under warranty.         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7 Inadequate inventory reserves due to obsolescence and declining market conditions..         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 Collectibility of receivables due to insufficient credit extension policies to new and existing customers.         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9 Technical support services are inadequate to ensure customer satisfaction.         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10 Inadequate policies and procedures over deferred revenue resulting in misstated sales.         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11 Significant profits will not be earned to recover investment in property, plant and equipment.         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 TOTAL        450 
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Risk Template 
 
   Level of Risk (Circle your choice) 
   
Risk Name 
 
Hours 
Very 
Low 
Moder-
ate 
Very
High 
1 Inaccurate valuation of investments.         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   2 
Insufficient R&D spending resulting in declining product 
performance and acceptability.  1       2 3 4 5 6 7
3 
Inability to purchase necessary components of inventory 
from suppliers.  1       2 3 4 5 6 7
4 Compensation insufficient to retain competent personnel.         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5 The Company’s environmental policies and procedures do not adequately prevent environmental issues.         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6 Inadequate warranty reserves established for products sold under warranty.         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7 Inadequate inventory reserves due to obsolescence and declining market conditions..         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 Collectibility of receivables due to insufficient credit extension policies to new and existing customers.         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9 Technical support services are inadequate to ensure customer satisfaction.         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10 Inadequate policies and procedures over deferred revenue resulting in misstated sales.         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11 Significant profits will not be earned to recover investment in property, plant and equipment.         1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 TOTAL        600 
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APPENDIX N 
 
 
RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX AND INSTRUCTIONS 
 
  
 
RISK ASSESSMENT TOOL 
 
Instructions 
 
1. Write on the chart on the next page to help you assess the level of each risk the manager 
has listed in the Risk Template. 
2.  Plot the number of each risk on the chart by assessing the significance and likelihood of 
occurrence for each risk. 
a. The vertical axis is the significance axis.  As you perceive a risk to be more 
significant/material to the audit, it should be plotted higher on the chart. 
b. The horizontal axis is the likelihood axis.  As you perceive a risk to be more likely 
to occur, it should be plotted further to the right on the chart. 
c. Determine where the intersection of the significance evaluation and the likelihood 
evaluation will fall.  Use this to help you assess the overall risk level on the 1 to 7 
scale included in the risk template.  Circle your final assessment in the risk 
template. 
d. For example if you believe that risk “4” is very significant, but highly unlikely, 
you should write the number 4 in quadrant II.  This quadrant represents 
moderate risks, therefore you will make your overall assessment in the 3-5 
part of the scale in the Risk Template. 
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High Likelihood
Risk Asses ent Tool 
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IV 
Low Risk
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